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Purpose: The purpose of this research is to investigate the link between ESG 
performance and corporate financial performance, both from a 
management and a market perspective, for the technology industry in 
the US. Focusing on one industry leads to more conclusive results 
than previous research conducted across-industry.  The approach used 
also helps to give a broad picture of the relationship between the 
overall ESG performance and corporate financial performance.  
Methodology: Quantitative approach using panel data method 
Literature review: This study is based on theories of corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility, as well as on previous findings about their 
relationship with corporate financial performance.   
Empirical 
framework: 
The quantitative study is based on a sample of a 100 listed US 
companies belonging to the technology sector, over the period from 
2009 to 2012.  
Findings: We find that overall ESG performance is positively associated with 
corporate financial performance, which is in line with previous 
research. We show that the results have different implications 
according to the perspective considered (market or accounting 
perspective). Moreover, results outline that not all three ESG pillars 
are significantly linked with corporate financial performance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues are a growing concern for investors, who 
are more drawn towards socially responsible investments (SRI) and believe in the intrinsic 
value of such criteria (Global Investor, 2013). Not only have concerns about environmental 
and social issues, such as global warming and child labour, grown among the public over the 
last decades, but scandals such as in Enron or WorldCom have highlighted the importance of 
strong governance. 
The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment underlines this trend in its annually 
published SRI report for the US market. In 2012, $3.74 trillion assets were SRIs compared to 
$2.71 trillion in 2010, thus an increase of 38%. Hereby, the market for SRI is growing at a 
higher rate than the general volume of invested assets under professional management. From 
the $3.74 trillion investments following SRI strategies, $3.31 trillion are invested by taking 
into account environmental, social and governance data for the investment decision (US SIF 
Foundation, 2012). These developments show how ESG indicators are increasingly taken into 
consideration by investors.  
Companies are aware of this evolution and are strengthening their efforts to provide investors 
with extra-financial data. ESG indicators are created to capture additional dimensions of 
corporate performance, which are not reflected in accounting data (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). 
Thus, this kind of information is getting gradually more included into corporate 
communication (Arvidsson, 2010; Ihlen, 2008). “The concept of ESG issues refers to extra-
financial material information about the challenges and performance of a company on these 
matters. It thus delivers additional relevant information, allowing more differentiated 
investment judgements by enabling investors to better assess risks and opportunities” (Bassen 
& Kovacs, 2008, p.184).  Not only have ESG indicators become key indicators for the non-
financial firm performance, but they are also commonly used to assess competencies of a 
company’s management as well as to support risk management (Galbreath, 2013). 
In the same manner, stock markets seem to grant more and more importance to ESG data, 
being seen as a support to SRI decisions. For example, in 2013 the New York Stock 
Exchange Euronext launched several ESG indices to be used as a benchmark for fund 
managers and companies, as the demand for responsible investments keeps on growing 
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(NYSE Euronext, 2013). Not only has it become more common in the United States, but it is 
also an observable worldwide trend.  
This paper aims to complement previous research done in the field of linking environmental, 
social, and governance performance to corporate financial performance (CFP). The prevailing 
questions are if socially responsible companies are destroying or creating value and how their 
operating performance is affected. Although there is much existing literature on firm’s 
financial performance in relation to socially responsible aspects (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; Viviers & Eccles, 2011), we still find that existing studies 
lack the following points.  
First, a lot of previous research is done in the form of event-studies. Events, such as corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) announcements, newspaper articles releases, and environmental 
performance awards are investigated. The market reaction to such events is tested by 
analysing stock market performance, but these studies do not consider the influence on 
performance in the long run (Arya & Zhang, 2009; Flammer, 2013; Klassen & McLaughlin, 
1996; Robinson, Kleffner & Bertels, 2011). 
Second, many studies focus on the performance of SRI indices and SRI funds in comparison 
to conventional indices (Derwall, 2007; Renneboog, Horst & Zhang, 2008b; Robinson, 
Kleffner & Bertels, 2011; Schröder, 2007).  When investigating stock market returns of SRI 
funds/indices, a common shortcoming is the lack of clarity about which, how many, and to 
what extent the three different ESG aspects are considered for the composition of the 
funds/indices (Derwall, 2007).  
Third, we find that there are limited studies taking into account all the dimensions of ESG, 
thus, not giving a broad picture of the overall ESG score’s impact (Galbreath, 2013). There 
are many studies focusing only on CSR aspects (including social and environmental aspects), 
and often neglecting the governance factor. As an illustration, previous studies commonly use 
the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) database to assess corporate social performance 
(Derwall, 2007; Manescu, 2011, McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), but KLD indicators can be 
criticised as they barely capture corporate governance issues (Galbreath, 2013). Other 
common independent variables are eco-efficiency scores, participation in corporate 
environmental standards, corporate governance provisions, compliance with the Global 
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Reporting Initiative, etc. (Derwall, 2007; Dowell, Hart & Yeung, 2000; Gompers, Ishii & 
Metrick, 2003; Nuryaman, 2013).  
Fourth, some researchers claim that there is a lack of studies focusing on one specific industry 
(Barnett, 2007; Soana, 2011). Scholars highlight the fact that strategies and the influence of 
environmental, social, and governance aspects vary across industries and are difficult to 
compare (Bauer et al., 2008; Bertoletti, 2010; Johnson, Moorman & Sorescu, 2009; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Moura-Leite, Padgett & Galan, 2012). 
To complement previous research done, this study addresses questions on how the overall 
ESG performance is related to CFP. ESG indicators allow to capture and measure the extra-
financial performance in all three dimensions of ESG issues (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). Thus, 
we investigate if firms which are putting effort into having high ESG indicators are 
performing better financially. Contrary to previous studies in this field, this paper takes all 
three aspects (environmental, social, and governance), equally weighted, into consideration. 
Thereby, financial performance is analysed on the one hand through operating performance 
and on the other hand through firm value in order to study both accounting-based and market-
based measures. Thus, we are able to give a management as well as a market perspective on 
the topic. In the second step, we are interested in testing if each pillar of the ESG concept is 
equally important concerning its impact on financial performance.  
The study is conducted on the US technology sector between the years 2009 and 2012. This 
allows to study the performance over time and to highlight the post crisis period. The 
financial crisis has deeply affected corporate performance and emphasises the importance of 
long-term value creation, to which ESG performance could represent a decisive value driver 
(KPMG, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2011).  
Due to the lack of industry studies, we specifically decide to focus on the technology sector, 
which is of particular interest looking at current ESG issues surrounding the industry, e.g. 
social issues with child labour, environmental issues with product life-cycle problems, and 
even corporate governance scandals with polemic around CEO remuneration and the non-
respect of shareholders rights (MacLeans, 2013). Previous research highlights the relevance 
of country level studies because differences in culture and regulations affect CSR intensity 
(Doh & Guay, 2006), and because they create a less noisy and more homogenous dataset 
(Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). Considering these factors and data availability, we 
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choose the US market which leaves us with the broadest sample for the empirical research. 
Moreover, the US is of particular interest as SRI and ESG issues are a rising concern due to 
the past corporate scandals, the recent financial crisis and the high degree of environmental 
pollution (Worldbank, 2014).   
This paper is structured as follows. First, we define CSR and corporate governance as the 
underlying concepts of ESG issues, and we give an overview of the technology sector. 
Second, the theoretical framework is presented, on which we build our hypotheses. The 
following section outlines the methodology applied for the empirical analysis. Finally, we 
analyse the empirical findings and highlight their contribution to the existing literature as well 
as the implications for practitioners and possible future research. 
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2. Definitions of concepts 
2.1 The roots of the ESG concept 
The origin of the ESG notion is grounded in the field of SRI. SRI strategies are not only 
taking into account economic aspects, but also environmental, social, and governance issues. 
ESG aspects are also called the three pillars of sustainability (Staub-Bisnang, 2012). The 
Brundtland report published by the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(1987) is one of the first definitions of sustainability (Barkemeyer et al., 2014). It outlines 
three dimensions of sustainability: environmental, social and economic. Similar is the concept 
of the Triple Bottom Line – People, Planet, Profit – by Elkington (1997). Whereas the notion 
of ‘Planet’ refers to a company’s environmental responsibility, the term ‘People’ denotes a 
company’s social responsibility towards their employees and the community it is operating in. 
The third element, ‘Profit’, represents the economic value and benefits a company is creating 
(Elkington, 1997). These are two of many concepts on which companies base their CSR 
policies (Hopkins, 2007). In both definitions one can see that the notion of corporate 
governance is left out. Contrarily, recent studies claim that good governance and 
sustainability cannot be treated separately and that corporate governance should be included 
in the concept of sustainability (Galbreath, 2013; Saltaji 2013). Likewise, besides 
environmental and social aspects, institutional investors are more and more taking corporate 
governance criteria into consideration in their SRI analysis (US SIF Foundation, 2012). 
Thus, the ESG indicators capture a wider range of companies’ socially responsible behaviour. 
They are not only considering environmental and social performance that is part of classical 
CSR, but also the third pillar of corporate governance. In the following sections, CSR and 
corporate governance, the concepts behind the three pillars of ESG, are presented in more 
detail. 
2.2 Corporate social responsibility 
Carroll (1979, p.40) describes CSR as follows: “the social responsibility of business 
encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, discretionary (philanthropic) expectations that 
society has of organizations at a given point in time”. This definition is the foundation of 
Carroll’s pyramid of CSR (1991), which uses a 4-part conceptualisation based on the idea that 
a company has obligations towards society, these obligations being not only legal and 
economic, but also ethical and discretionary (philanthropic).  
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Exhibit 2.1: The pyramid of CSR 
Source: Carroll (1991, p.42) 
 
CSR has been studied for more than four decades. Dalhsrud (2007) identifies no less than 37 
different definitions, and the concept of CSR is constantly evolving (Carroll & Shabana, 
2010; Vogel, 2005). Garriga and Melé (2004) propose a classification of the different 
approaches into four theoretical categories: instrumental theories, political theories, 
integrative theories and ethical theories (See section 4.1.1). 
The CSR practices mainly cover two pillars of the ESG concept: environmental and social 
issues. Companies aim to reduce their business’ impact on the environment. Due to the 
climate change and the growing world population, main issues for companies are to reduce 
their CO2-emissions as well as their water consumption (Dolique, 2007). The concept of eco-
efficiency is a tool used by companies to measure and monitor their environmental impact 
throughout the whole life-cycle of their products. The objective is to reduce consumption of 
resources and waste as well as to use renewable materials and to enhance the multi-
functionality of products (Melquiot, 2003). Social issues are covering topics like the 
healthcare policies of companies, human rights issues such as the prohibition of child labour 
and forced labour, healthy and safe working conditions, regulation of working hours and 
salaries, diversity without discrimination of race, gender or religion as well as the promotion 
of training and development programs (Laville, 2009; Stellmann, 2000).  
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2.3 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is defined as the “rules and practices by which companies are 
governed or run” (Encyclopӕdia Britannica, 2014). The roots of corporate governance lie in 
different theories. One of the underlying theories is the agency theory. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976, p.308) define “an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” If both parties of the 
contract aim to maximise their own welfare, it can be assumed that decisions made by the 
agent are not always in the best interest of the principal. The theory is based on a dilemma 
defined by Adam Smith in 1776 (cited in Tricker, 2012):  It cannot be expected from a firm’s 
directors (agents) who are managing other people’s money that they are taking care of it in the 
same way as they would do it with their own money. Thus, in order to make agents act in the 
interests of the shareholders (principals), the latter has to give the right incentives and/or bear 
costs to monitor the agent, the so-called agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Based on this theory, Fama and Jensen (1983, p.302) propose that firms should “separate the 
ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the decisions.” 
In a company this is achieved by separating the management from the board of directors. 
Hereby, the management has the executive function and delegates tasks throughout the 
organisation, whereas the board’s task is to supervise those executive activities. In the US, 
this is generally realised by establishing unitary boards with executive directors and non-
executive outside directors (Tricker, 2012). 
In order to protect shareholders, there is also legal coverage. La Porta et al. (1998) find that 
common-law countries like the US have the strongest shareholder protection compared to 
other legal systems. In the rule-based US model, companies have to follow the company law 
which is based on case laws and varies for the different states in the country. The investor 
protection is supervised on the federal level by the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) which for example requires listed firms to form a board audit, nomination and 
remuneration committee. Protection is also strengthened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 
which increases the disclosure requirements for companies towards their stakeholders. 
Additionally, guidelines and principles in corporate governance codes, published by 
international agencies or the companies themselves, encourage firms to implement on a 
voluntarily basis good governance practices (Tricker, 2012). 
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2.4 The convergence of CSR and corporate governance 
Both concepts, CSR and corporate governance, are concerned with how companies run their 
business and how they wish to impact the business environment they are operating in. Hence, 
both can be seen as a strategic management tool. Yet, the two concepts cover different topics, 
but they can be merged together as they offer a complementary view on issues surrounding 
business activities (Rosam & Peddle, 2004). This convergence is mainly influenced by the 
increased regulatory pressure, the demand for business ethics after the occurrence of several 
corporate scandals as well as through the request of SRI investors (Money & Schepers, 2007). 
In the 21st century, corporate governance focuses on new issues such as ethics, accountability, 
transparency and disclosure. Moreover, CSR uses corporate governance as a tool to integrate 
environmental and social issues in business strategy and decision making, not only to benefit 
shareholders, but also to benefit other stakeholders (Gill, 2008). This is for example reflected 
in the creation of board functions and committees for CSR topics. Money and Schepers 
(2007) show that directors believe in a connection between responsibility and performance 
and they think that it is impossible to achieve shareholder value without simultaneously 
creating stakeholder value. “Both CSR and CG corporate governance are concepts that 
allow organizations to operate profitably yet in a socially and environmentally responsible 
manner to achieve business sustainability and stakeholder satisfaction” (Rosam & Peddle, 
2004, p.3). In addition, the convergence of the two approaches serves as a driver for long-
term performance and provides an efficient tool for risk management and to improve 
reputation by avoiding corporate scandals (Money & Schepers, 2007).  
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3. The US technology sector 
 
As mentioned, the focus of this study is on the technology sector. According to Thomson 
Reuters (2012b) business classification, the technology sector covers technology equipment 
(hardware), software and IT services as outlined in the exhibit below. 
 
 
Exhibit 3.1: The technology sector 
Source: Thomson Reuters (2012b) 
The technology industry is highly competitive, which leaves technology firms with few 
possible strategic options in order to increase profit, e.g. internationalisation, innovation or 
pricing strategies (Xerfi, 2012). Indeed, innovation and R&D investments are a key value 
driver due to the obsolescence of products, but also because it is a way to create market 
differentiation as well as to stimulate replacement purchases, e.g. tablets. In addition, brand 
image is also an important factor for the technology industry (Xerfi, 2012). At the same time, 
the fierce competition has put pressure on prices, leading technology firms to manufacture or 
to outsource their production in “low-cost areas”, like South-East Asia. This strategic choice 
offers opportunities in terms of cost savings, but it has exposed firms to criticism linked with 
labour conditions such as the abuse of child labour (Van Liemt, 2007). 
Companies of the technology sector have shown very different commitments to ESG issues. 
Some companies of the sector benefit from good reputation, like Google and Microsoft. Both 
are ranked among the companies with the best reputation in the world (Reputation Institute, 
2014). However, concerns and controversies have also been raised on subjects such as the 
working conditions in China (e.g. Foxconn as a supplier of Apple), the environmental impact 
of electronics throughout their product life cycle as well as the huge energy consumption of 
data centres (Martinuzzi et al., 2011). More recently, governance issues such as the respect of 
shareholders rights have been a concern in the technology industry (MacLeans, 2013). At the 
same time, “green products”1 are seen as a new way to differentiate products (Xerfi, 2012).  
                                                        
1
 ‘green products’ are “goods or services that minimize their impact on the environment at each phase of their 
life cycle” (Albino, Balice and Dangelico, 2009) 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment
Communications & Networking
Office Equipment
Electronic Equipment and Parts
Computers, Phones & Household Electronics
IT Services & Consulting
Software
Internet Services
Technology
Technology Equipment
Software & IT Services
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4. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
The purpose of this study is to link the ESG concept, thus both the concept of CSR and 
corporate governance, to CFP. As there is little research on this combined concept, we base 
our study on the existing research linking CSR to CFP, as well as studies on corporate 
governance and its impact on firm value and performance.   
4.1 The business case of ESG: from a management to a market perspective 
As noted by Carroll (1999), CSR could be considered as the building block of the theory of 
corporate social performance (CSP). Wood (1991, p.693) proposes a model for CSP that she 
defines as ‘a business organization’s configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness and policies programs and observable outcomes as they 
relate to the firm’s societal relationships’. Following this definition and the challenges of 
CSP, the principal argument for a company to engage in CSR (and to improve its CSP), lies in 
the concern of improving society (Carroll & Shabana, 2010). However, the development of 
CSR has raised the question whether improving CSP “pays off” or not, implying the need of a 
rationale and business justification to CSR investment. Kurucz, Colbert and Wheeler (2008) 
summarise the issue of the business case of CSR by asking if companies do perform better 
financially when they address both their core business and their responsibility to the broader 
society. As highlighted by Carroll and Shabana (2010), managers need to know if investing in 
CSR activities benefit their business, thus whether it helps them or not to meet the first 
responsibility of a business: the economic responsibility. As we will explain in further details 
in the next section, there have been arguments in favour and against CSR.  
4.1.1 CSR and financial performance: a management perspective 
When studying the link between CSP and CFP, academics have focused on two issues: the 
type of the relationship and the direction of causation (Waddock & Graves, 1997). It lacks of 
a clear conclusion when it comes to the nature of the link, may it be correlation or causality. 
Soana (2011) describes the four types of possible relationships between CSR and CFP: 
positive, negative, no-relationship (also known as neutral) and mixed relationship. Waddock 
and Graves (1997) present the two possible causal directions: changes in CSP influence 
financial performance (good management theory) or changes in financial performance 
influence CSP (slack resource theory).  
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The possible types of relationships between CSP and CFP have been deeply investigated 
(Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). Margolis and Walsh (2003) count no less than 109 
studies that use CSP as independent variable. Out of these 109 studies, 54 find a positive 
relationship between CSP and CFP, 7 a negative relationship, 28 find non-significance, and 
20 mixed results. This inconsistency in results further supports the divergent beliefs and 
views concerning the CSP and CFP relationship.  
Negative relationship 
Theorists defending the theory of shareholder wealth maximisation argue for a negative 
relationship between CSR and CFP (Barnett, 2007). Friedman (1970, p.1) states that the only 
“social responsibility of business is to increase profit”. Friedman argues that CSR is costly 
and the costs to implement CSR improvements are likely to outweigh the financial benefits.  
Hence, it reduces shareholders welfare by decreasing financial performance. Neo-classicists 
also believe that too few available measures of economic benefits from CSR exist while costs 
are numerous (Waddock & Graves, 1997).  
Moreover, Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) argue that firms that are socially responsible 
incur a competitive disadvantage by bearing costs that are not necessary or that should be 
borne by other agents, such as the government. Gray and Shadbegian (1993) find that 
environmental regulations are negatively associated with productivity, implying that CSR 
measures, in particular environmental ones, would have a negative impact on the firm 
financial and operating performance. More recently, Orlitzky (2013) suggests that CSR may 
have a negative impact on stock performance by increasing market volatility and creating a 
stock price bubble due to information asymmetry and the lack of a relationship between CSR 
and a firm’s economic fundamentals.  
Positive relationship 
Academics and practitioners defending the positive relationship theory argue for a positive 
link between CSR and financial performance of a firm, though the causal link is not obvious 
(Soana, 2011). According to Garriga and Melé (2004) and Vogel (2005), arguments for the 
positive relationship strongly differ between theorists supporting the ethical and integrative 
theories (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and theorists supporting instrumental 
theories (Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2011; Varadajaran & Menon, 1988).   
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Ethical and integrative theories – ‘doing good to do good’  
Ethical and integrative theories are based on the idea that businesses should do the right 
things to improve societal conditions and that they should integrate social demands (Garriga 
& Melé, 2004).  Following these views, CSR is seen as the moral condition of the business’ 
existence.  
The flagship of these theories is the stakeholder theory proposed by Freeman (1984). He 
bases the stakeholder theory on the idea that managers should have a fiduciary relationship to 
stakeholders implying that the scope of managers’ responsibility goes beyond the pure 
welfare of shareholders. Donaldson and Preston (1995) claim that an efficient stakeholder-
management relationship can be key to improve CFP. Jones (1995) explains this positive 
relationship by arguing that a strong stakeholder-management relationship serves as 
monitoring managers so they do not divert the attention from a firm’s financial goals. In 
addition, Freeman and Evan (1990) motivate the positive effect of this relationship by 
claiming that it can increase a firm’s capacity to adapt to changes in external demand, which 
is essential to sustain firm’s operating performance. Jensen (2002, cited in Koehler & 
Hespenheide, 2012) argues that when the focus is on long-term performance, ignoring or 
neglecting any important stakeholders of a firm affects negatively long-term market value. 
Thus, he implies that the maximisation of shareholder value is not enough.  
Alexander and Buchholz (1978, cited in Barnett & Salomon, 2006) and Bowman and Haire 
(1975) argue that CSP is a proxy for management quality. Improving social performance 
indicates that a firm has a high quality management because it is a sign of their understanding 
on how to improve a firm’s relationship with its environment, whether internal and external.  
Instrumental theories – ‘doing good to do well’ 
CSR instrumental theories, such as strategies for achieving competitive advantage (Porter & 
Kramer, 2006, 2011) and cause-related marketing (Varadajaran & Menon, 1988), highlight 
the idea that CSR and CFP can be positively related if a company uses CSR strategically. 
Thus, CSR is seen as a tool to maximise shareholder value. Kurucz, Colbert and Wheeler 
(2008) point out four main reasons for companies to embrace CSR: cost and risk reduction, 
gaining competitive advantage, developing reputation and legitimacy and seeking win-win 
outcomes through synergistic value creation.  
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Porter and Kramer (2006) argue that rather than focusing on responsive CSR, seen as a source 
of costs and based on the idea that economic growth comes at the expense of social welfare or 
vice versa (Friedman, 1970), companies should think of CSR as a strategic tool. In this view, 
CSR can benefit both society and a company’s performance and be a source of competitive 
advantage, even innovation. In this way, they defend both the argument of synergistic value 
creation, as well as the argument of gaining competitive advantage. Porter and Kramer (2011) 
later refer to the process of strategic CSR as a way to create “shared value”. They argue that 
pro-active CSR management is a tool that can increase a firm’s competitive position, and is 
therefore positively affecting its operating and financial performance. Porter and Kramer’s 
arguments (2006) can be supported by the findings of Hillman and Keim (2001). They split 
social performance in two components: stakeholder management, including primary 
stakeholders (shareholders, employees and customers) and social issue participation which 
refers to the use of corporate resources for social issues outside of firm strategy. They find 
that social performance through stakeholder management is directly associated to shareholder 
value creation whereas social issue participation is not.  
A second possible benefit of ESG comes from reputational benefits. Varadajaran and Menon 
(1988) argue that CSR, even philanthropic CSR, can be a powerful marketing tool for a 
company. It can help increase a company’s revenue by building a brand in a socially 
responsible dimension. They define cause-related marketing as “the process of formulating 
and implementing marketing activities that are characterized by an offer from the firm to 
contribute a specified amount to a designated cause when customers engage in a revenue-
providing exchange that satisfy organizational and individual objectives” (Varadajaran & 
Menon, 1998, p.60). This line of reasoning, linking CSR with reputational benefits, can be 
supported by empirical evidence from Turban and Greening (1996). Furthermore, Fisman, 
Heal and Nair (2005) find that social issue participation is positively associated to firm 
financial performance, but only in advertising-intensive industries.  
Another approach is that ESG performance can relate to operating performance through cost 
and risk reduction. Koelher and Hespenheide (2013) identify ESG issues which can directly 
impact a company’s financial performance by affecting its operations and sales. Examples of 
negative impacts are linked with product risks (toxic chemicals, boycotts, recalls), supply 
chain risks (child labour, natural resource use) or even operational risks (employee strikes, 
penalties and fine linked with environmental and social concerns). Barnett (2007) supports the 
importance of stakeholder management in the same perspective, arguing that improving 
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trustworthiness and strengthening the relationship with stakeholders lead to reduced 
transaction costs (decreasing employee turnover, improved talent pool, union avoidance), thus 
to financial gain. On the environmental level, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) and King and 
Lenox (2000) argue that low environmental performance leads to competitive disadvantage, 
as it is a sign of operational inefficiency. 
Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003) conduct a meta-analysis of the relationship between CSP 
and CFP based on 52 existing studies to conclude that social responsibility, and to a lesser 
extent, environmental responsibility, is financially rewarded. This further strengthens 
previous empirical findings from Waddock and Graves (1997), Hillman and Keim (2001) and 
Nelling and Webb (2009) who find the existence of a ‘virtuous circle’: increasing CSR leads 
to improvement of financial performance and vice-versa.  
Neutral relationship 
The neutral relationship implies that CSR and CFP are not related. The body of research 
defending this theory argues that no relationship can be found because too many variables are 
involved when explaining the potential link between social and financial performance 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997).  
Ullman (1985) highlights the fact that the lack of significant results may be due to 
measurement problems and deficiencies in the theoretical framework. In addition, Aupperle, 
Carroll and Hatfield (1985) do not find any relationship between CSR and profitability, using 
Carroll’s conceptual framework of CSR (1979).  
Mixed relationship 
The mixed relationship theory defines the link between CSR and CFP as inconsistent 
overtime. Soana (2011) argues that this relationship can take two forms: “U” or “inverted U”.  
The former implies that the effect of CSR is not immediately observable; meaning that CSR 
can first result in a bigger increase in costs than profit but that this tendency reverses over 
time. The “inverted U” theory suggests that there is an optimum level of CSR. Mintzberg 
(1983) argues that CSR is rewarded only to a certain extent.  
As we can see, neither empirical findings supporting theory of value creation through CSR 
lead to a clearly positive relationship between CSR and CFP, nor does research support the 
value destruction theory (Nelling & Webb, 2009). In other words, empirical findings are 
highly inconsistent.  
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4.1.2 Corporate governance and financial performance 
 
Corporate governance - a way to promote firm value and performance 
Most of the literature linking corporate governance and financial performance is based on the 
agency problem introduced in section 2.3: managers are responsible for other people’s money. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737) outline “corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.” This is achieved by a well-functioning system of corporate governance 
mechanisms protecting the investors from self-interested managers and by the repatriation of 
the firm’s income to the financial investors. Thus, good governance is an instrument to 
increase firm value and performance. Efficient ways to achieve good governance are given by 
legal protection, the alignment of investor’s and manager’s interests through incentives, a 
concentrated ownership, better monitoring, and transparency (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Several empirical studies have been conducted in order to investigate how corporate 
governance affects financial performance. Three different measures have been mainly used to 
conduct the research: stock return, firm value and operating performance. The interrelation 
between the different measures is explained as follows. Good corporate governance 
mechanisms lead to higher investor trust. Thus, investors might assess well-governed firms as 
less risky and might expect a lower rate of return leading to higher firm value (Bauer, 
Guenster & Otten, 2004). Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that well-governed firms might 
have a more efficient operating performance and therefore, expected future cash-flows are 
higher compared to poorly governed companies, leading to higher firm value in the long-run.  
Positive relationship between corporate governance and financial performance 
Most of the existing research is empirically showing the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value as well as performance. La Porta et al. (2002) find 
empirical evidence that firm value is higher in countries where the legal system ensures the 
protection of minority shareholders. Other research investigates this relationship by focusing 
on corporate governance standards on a firm level. For the US market, Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) find that companies with weaker governance mechanisms, measured by board 
and ownership structure, have stronger agency problems and therefore perform worse. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) study US companies in the 1990s by constructing an index 
which measures governance performance on a firm level. They show that firms with weak 
corporate governance (e.g. less shareholder rights) have a significant lower firm value and 
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lower subsequent share returns. As an explanation for the relationship between stock returns 
and governance they outline that weak governance mechanisms lead to agency costs which 
are underestimated by investors. Thus, expectations about cash flows are lowered, leading to a 
decrease in stock price. In addition, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) state that a part of 
their results can be explained by industry classifications being another factor influencing 
stock returns. In terms of operating performance, strong governance has a positive and 
significant relationship with net profit margin, one-year sales growth, and a positive but 
insignificant relationship with return on equity.  
Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2008) find consistent results with the study of Gompers, Ischii 
and Metrick (2003). Furthermore, they identify that only six out of the 24 entrenchments2 
Gompers, Ischii and Metrick build their index on are driving empirical results. They highlight 
that the other 18 provisions are related to neither firm value nor abnormal returns. 
Cremers and Nair (2005) and Brown and Caylor (2006) complement previous research by 
separating corporate governance into internal (e.g. blockholders and board of directors) and 
external mechanisms (e.g. takeovers and market for corporate control).  They confirm 
previous positive relationships of abnormal returns and good corporate governance by 
showing the importance of two governance mechanisms: takeover vulnerability and 
shareholder activism. 
Complementing and opposing research 
Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) find that companies with weak shareholder rights are 
showing feeble operating performance, but also that the market is aware of this fact and not 
surprised by the underperformance. Contrary to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Core, 
Guay and Rusticus (2006) as well as Bhagat and Bolton (2008) cannot confirm that poor 
governance also indicates low stock returns. Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) justify this 
result by claiming that the time period used in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s study might be 
influenced by a period-specific factor, as for example the “New Economy” in the 90s. This 
assumption is made as they find that firms with poor governance have slightly higher returns 
than firms with strong governance in the period subsequent to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s 
study. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) give two additional explanations. First, they claim that 
studies finding a positive relationship between governance and stock return might not have 
                                                        
2
 The six relevant entrenchments are: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, 
golden parachutes, supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments 
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properly adjusted their results for unobservable risk components. Second, the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance might be endogenous, possibly 
weakening the explanatory power of the results. Johnson, Moorman and Sorescu (2009) test 
the robustness of Grompers, Ishii and Metrick’s results by adjusting more precisely for 
industry clustering in the different portfolios. Unlike Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), they 
find statistically zero long-term abnormal returns by applying the same investment strategy.  
Research has also been done in other markets than the US. Bauer, Guenster and Otten (2004) 
study the European market by applying Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003) methodology. 
Consistent with Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), their results show that governance is 
positively related to firm value and stock returns, but contrarily, they find a significant 
negative relationship between governance and firm performance, when measured by net profit 
margin and return on equity. As an explanation they assume that accounting numbers might 
be biased and that the negative relationship found is possibly explained through less 
conservative earnings estimates of badly governed companies.  
Adapting country specific governance standards 
The less elaborated a country’s corporate governance standards are, the stronger is the 
relationship between governance and firm value as well as abnormal stock returns (Bauer, 
Guenster & Otten, 2004; Chira, 2014). Krafft et al. (2013) investigate the influence of 
corporate governance on firm value and performance with focus on convergence of corporate 
governance systems, with the example of non-US companies which are adopting US 
corporate governance standards. They find a significant and positive relationship between 
corporate governance and both firm value and operating performance. Similar results are 
found by Chira (2014) who studies the implication of cross-listing of foreign companies on 
the US stock markets. Her study shows significant higher abnormal returns for these 
companies, both in the short- and long-term. The lower the governance standards in the 
country of origin, the higher the abnormal returns yielded. This can be explained by Coffee’s 
bonding hypothesis (1999, 2002 cited in Chira 2014) stating that foreign companies starting 
to operate on the US market are adopting higher governance standards due to the stronger 
regulatory system enforced by the SEC. Similarly, Klapper and Love (2004) assume that 
improvements in the efficiency of the country’s legal system lead also to an improvement of 
firm level governance standards. 
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The importance of specific corporate governance criteria 
Overall, the different studies imply that changes in the factors determining good governance 
can lead to different results. Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrel (2008), Brown and Caylor (2006) 
and Bauer et al. (2008) show that only a small subset of factors provided by different 
databases and indices are positively linked to firm value and performance. Thus, they 
conclude that not all criteria of indices are driving the positive relationship. Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrel (2008) suppose that indices granting weight to too many irrelevant factors might be 
an inaccurate measure of corporate governance. Additionally, companies might be misguided 
and are improving mechanisms which are not worthwhile improving them just to score better 
in a specific rating.  
4.1.3 ESG and financial performance: a market perspective 
We previously developed a view on CSR from a management perspective. As we mentioned, 
ESG indicators are mostly created as a benchmark for investors to assess the social, 
environmental, and governance performance of a company. The increasing concern toward 
ESG issues has led to a rapid growth of SRI, fulfilling both financial and social goals of 
investors (Renneboog, Horst & Zhang, 2008a).  
On investor reaction to CSR performance, Flammer (2013) conducts an event study on the 
stock market reaction to the announcement of eco-friendly and eco-harmful corporate news in 
the US, and her findings confirm that shareholders react positively to eco-friendly initiatives 
and negatively to harmful behaviour. Hamilton, Jo and Statman (1993) claim that financial 
market’s reactions (and investors’ reactions) to CSR can take three different forms: the 
market does not value CSR, the market values CSR, and there is disequilibrium because of 
inefficient pricing of CSR. Barnett and Salomon (2006) demonstrate that excess performance 
of SRI funds compared to traditional funds have not been clearly proven, with empirical 
research supporting the three possible results. 
From an investor point of view, benefits of CSR activities for a company can be considered 
from the risk-return perspective (Derwall, 2007). Indeed, companies with high ESG scores 
have been regarded as less risky because they are seen as more sustainable in the long-term. 
Consistent with the risk-return relationship, investors ask a lower return on ESG companies, 
which makes these companies benefit from higher firm value due to a lower discount rate 
(Derwall, 2007).  
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The mispricing scenario implies that ESG performance does affect firm performance, but 
stock performance does not reflect it efficiently because of the lack of information availability 
(Manescu, 2011). Moreover, Flammer (2013) argues that bad news related to CSR 
performance is more harmful to a company than positive news is rewarding. She argues that 
‘CSR is a resource with decreasing marginal returns and insurance-like features’ (Flammer, 
2013, p.758). Derwall (2007) explains this mispricing by the difficulty encountered by 
investors when it comes to assessing ESG performance, which is sometimes highly 
intangible. Mintzberg (1983) argues that CSR is rewarded only to a certain extent by the 
financial markets: “the stock market is willing to reward social responsibility only to a point. 
It pays to be good but not too good” (Mintzberg, 1983, p.10). 
4.2 Construction of hypotheses 
In the previous parts, we outline the different theories behind the relationship between CSR 
and the financial performance of companies as well as the concepts about governance and its 
impact on firm value and firm performance. Several researchers show that the concepts of 
corporate governance and CSR should not be treated separately, as both mutually influence 
long-term performance (Galbreath, 2013; Gill, 2008; Money & Schepers, 2007; Rosam & 
Peddle, 2004; Saltaji, 2013). 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to combine environmental, social, and governance performance 
and to illustrate the link to a firm’s financial performance. Social performance can be 
measured by indicators and ethical ratings, (Soana, 2011) and consequently, we are looking 
for such measures to capture all three dimensions. ESG indicators have been introduced as a 
way to measure this kind of extra-financial information and to illustrate a part of firm value 
which cannot be explained by traditional financial reporting (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). The 
problem that most of the stakeholders are facing is that the disclosure of non-financial 
performance varies from company to company and is difficult to compare (Eccles et al., 
2012). Bassen and Kovacs (2008) argue that ESG indicators are potential solutions to the 
issues presented above, and they urge the need for further research studying the link between 
ESG issues and CFP. This will be one of the most crucial factors determining the use and 
proliferation of ESG information and metrics (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). Supporting this 
argument, we have recently seen an increased number of studies in the field of corporate 
finance using the ESG indicators (Attig et al., 2013; Galbreath, 2013; Oikonomou, Brooks & 
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Pavelin; 2014; Siew, Balabat & Carmichael, 2013), which we want to complement by linking 
ESG indicators to financial performance. 
To build the hypotheses, a deductive approach is used, referring to previous research about 
financial performance done in the area of CSR, CSP and corporate governance. As outlined 
above, the business case for ESG can be analysed under two complementary perspectives: a 
management perspective, related to operating performance, and a market perspective, 
focusing on investors’ perception and belief about ESG performance reflected in firm value. 
There are different theories that positively link CSR to operating performance explained by 
several approaches; for example improving operating performance through the management-
stakeholder relationship, through the increased demand for ethical companies products, or 
through the use of CSR as risk management tool (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & 
Evan, 1990; Jones, 1995, Koehler & Hespenheide, 2012). Similarly, governance is linked 
positively to operating performance, as well-governed firms experience less agency problems 
which could translate into better operating performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For both 
concepts several empirical studies confirm a positive relationship between environmental 
(Derwall, 2007; Flammer, 2013), social (Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003) and governance 
(Bauer, Guenster and Otten, 2004; Core, Guay & Rusticus, 2006; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 
2003) measures to operating performance.  
Our purpose is to test the same relationship taking into account not only a single dimension of 
ESG, but to test for the overall impact of these indicators. Acknowledging that the concepts of 
CSR as well as corporate governance and ESG are closely related, we also expect a positive 
relationship between ESG scores and firm’s operating performance. 
Hypothesis 1: ESG scores relate positively to operating performance, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 1.0: Companies with high ESG scores are associated with higher operating 
performance than companies with lower ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 1.1: Companies with low ESG scores are associated with lower operating 
performance than companies with higher ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
In the long run, good operating performance should translate in higher firm value. In addition, 
extra-financial performance and investor’s perspectives and expectations are reflected in the 
valuation of listed firms. (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008).  In the corporate governance literature, it 
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is argued that good governance increases investor’s trust which results in higher firm value 
(Bauer, Guenster & Otten, 2004). In the field of CSR, especially instrumental theories argue 
for value creation through environmental and social performance (Porter & Kramer 2006, 
2011; Varadajaran & Menon, 1988). Empirically, studies also confirm a positive link between 
value creation and corporate governance (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, 2008, Gompers, Ishii & 
Metrick, 2003) as well as value creation between environmental and social performance (Al-
Najjar & Anfimiadou, 2012; Derwall, 2007; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Sinkin, Wright & 
Burnett, 2008). Concerning the overall performance of the three dimensions, there is a 
growing belief that ESG performance and long-term value creation are related (KPMG, 
2011). Consistent with this belief and previous research about environmental, social and 
governance performance, we expect a positive relationship between the overall ESG scores 
and value creation. 
Hypothesis 2: ESG scores relate positively to firm value, ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2.0: Companies with high ESG scores are associated with higher 
firm value than companies with lower ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 2.1: Companies with low ESG scores are associated with lower 
firm value than companies with higher ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
Several corporate governance studies outline that not all components of governance scores 
and indices are equally driving the impact on financial performance. In the same manner, it is 
interesting to decompose the overall ESG scores. Thus, the last hypothesis is built to assess 
the link of each ESG pillar with CFP. Practitioners outline that ESG aspects form the three 
pillars of sustainability (Staub-Bisnang, 2013), for this reason, it is expected that each pillar is 
of equal importance. This hypothesis provides a deeper understanding of the characteristics of 
the overall ESG performance for the technology industry.  
Hypothesis 3.0: E, S and G scores are equally important for operating performance,      
ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 3.1: E, S and G scores are equally important for firm value,                           
ceteris paribus.  
These hypotheses lay the foundation of this study, and they will be investigated using the 
methodology described in the following section.   
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5. Methodology and Data 
 
The previous section outlines the hypotheses to be tested in this study. To do so, quantitative 
research methods are used. Henceforth, this section provides a detailed description of the 
statistical method, the data and the variables used in this thesis.  
5.1 Methodology approach 
Looking at prior literature, there is a clear deficit in longitudinal studies investigating the link 
between ESG scores and financial performance from an industry perspective and over time. 
As there are plenty of event studies (Waddock & Graves, 1997), this study investigates the 
relationship between variables over the years 2009 to 2012 in the form of a panel data study. 
Panel data has the advantage to take into consideration both cross-sectional variations and 
variations over time in a time series dimension. Not only is it more informative than one-
dimensional methods, but results can also more easily be generalised as it reduces possible 
impacts of temporal errors that could affect the data (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
The empirical analysis is based on the methodology used by Derwall (2007) for studying the 
link between eco-efficiency and financial performance, using both accounting and market 
perspectives. While Derwall (2007) uses the Fama-Macbeth model for the analysis, this 
research uses the ordinary least squares (OLS)3 estimation technique, which is also used by 
Waddock and Graves (1997) when studying the link between CSP and CFP. Compared to 
previous studies, variables are not lagged because previous findings show that there is no 
clear direction of causality between ESG performance and CFP, but rather a “virtuous circle” 
(Nelling & Webb, 2009; Soana, 2011). 
5.2 Data  
5.2.1 Sample 
This research is based on a final sample of 100 listed US companies belonging to the 
technology sector (Appendix I). Selection criteria are presented later in this section. A non-
probability sampling method is used to be able to have the most representative sample, which 
should include the highest possible number of listed US companies being part of the 
technology sector.  
                                                        
3
 Skoulakis (2008) shows that in presence of a large number of cross-sections, both Fama-Macbeth and OLS 
provide reliable results (see section 5.6).  
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A shortcoming in previous literature is the lack of industry level studies. Soana (2011), who 
carried out a study on the CSP-CFP link in the banking sector in the US, motivates the 
relevance of industry level studies, as CSP characteristics can vary a lot from an industry to 
another. Barnett (2007) also argues that industry level studies may be a first step into better 
understanding the business case for CSR, on a more specific level, as it seems obvious that 
empirical findings have, so far, failed in generalising it on a universal level. 
This study focuses on only one country, the United States. First, focusing on a single country 
reduces possible noise that could affect the results, coming from differences in regulatory 
backgrounds, cultural factors or macroeconomics tendencies (Renneboog, Ter Horst, & 
Zhang, 2008a), i.e. the high listing requirements of the SEC for the US stock markets. 
Second, Holder-Webb et al. (2009) notice that cross-country studies agree to the existence of 
differences in disclosure of information concerning ESG. This study focuses on the US for 
two main reasons. First, due to the size of the country and the importance of its financial 
markets, it eases the access to a larger sample of listed companies belonging to the same 
industry (Datastream, 2014). For instance, the technology sector is well developed in the US. 
The country is home to the industry leaders in hardware (e.g. HP, Dell, Apple), software (e.g. 
Microsoft, Oracle) and Internet companies (e.g. Google, Yahoo, Facebook) (Xerfi, 2012). 
Second, the US market is one of the most developed in terms of SRI with no less than $3.74 
trillion of assets under management of SRI mutual funds in 2012 (US SIF Foundation, 2012). 
The use of a longitudinal study impacts directly the size of the sample. To determine the 
companies that should be part of the sample, Thomson Reuters (2012b) business classification 
is used to select companies classified in the technology sector. The sample is reduced to 
companies for which ESG data is available for the period from 2009 to 2012 and to 
companies being listed on the stock market prior to 2009. This leads to a sample of 102 
companies, from which two companies are deliberately excluded: Motorola Solutions and 
Eastman Kodak. Both are currently belonging to the technology sector; however those two 
companies have undertaken deep restructuring and paradigm changes in the last years4. 
A first limitation with the sample is the limited information available, which leads us to carry 
out the study only on 100 companies of the technology sector (Thomson Reuters, 2012b).  
                                                        
4
 Eastman Kodak has belonged to electronic goods prior to the company’s restructuring after filing for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy in 2012 (Eastman Kodak, 2014). In the same manner, Motorola Solutions is traded as an 
independent entity only since 2011, after the company was split in the same year (Motorola Solutions, 2014). 
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5.2.2 Time period 
Based on data availability, the study period is set to a relatively short period of only four 
years, spanning from 2009 to 2012.  This is mainly due to the following facts. First, the ESG 
data on Thomson Reuters Datastream has not completely been published for the year 2013 by 
the time of carrying out this study. Second, most of the companies’ ESG historical 
performance is limited to four or five years of data. Third, this research is using a balanced 
data set including only companies which have been listed prior to 2009 and for which data is 
available over the four-year period. Considering the given limitations, the time period from 
2009 to 2012 allows us to study a maximal number of companies possible, so that our sample 
is more representative. In addition, this time period is of particular interest as the rise of the 
financial crisis has increased companies’ attention to ESG policies, due to the growing belief 
that ESG performance and long-term value creation are related (KPMG, 2011).  
5.3 Regression 
5.3.1 Regression equations 
This research uses a panel data method as the variables contain data that varies over cross-
sections and in the time-series dimension. All the regressions are run using OLS estimation 
technique.  
To study the link between ESG performance and CFP, a three-step approach is used, from 
both a management and a market perspective. Following the hypotheses of this research, 
operating performance and firm value are regressed against ESG performance separately, 
measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s q (Q) respectively. Each perspective is 
tested following the same methodology. A second equation investigates the non-linearity of 
the relationship using dummy variables for low and high ESG scores. Equation a1 and b1 use 
the overall ESG score of each firm to respectively study their relationship with operating 
performance and firm value. Equations a2 and b2 represent a complementary result to assess a 
possible disequilibrium, and give more information about the financial performance of the 
top-performers and laggards (Derwall, 2007). Finally, and to complement previous findings, 
the last regressions (Equations a3 and b3) use ESG performance of each pillar as three distinct 
independent variables.  
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This study spanning over four years (2009-2012) and using quarterly data for 100 companies, 
the panel data has 1600 entries. The general equations are as follows: 
 
ESG performance and operating performance (ROA): 
 
ROAit= αi+ ȕ0ESGscoreit+ ȖitXit+ εit      (a1) 
ROAit= αi+ ȕ0HighESGscoreit+ ȕ1LowESGscoreit+ ȖitXit+ εit   (a2) 
ROAit= αi+ ȕ0Environmental_scoreit+ ȕ1Social_scoreit+ ȕ2Governance_scoreit +  ȖitXit+ εit   
(a3) 
 
ESG performance and firm value (Q):  
Qit= αi+ ȕ0ESGscoreit+ ȖitXit+ εit     (b1) 
Qit= αi+ ȕ0HighESGscoreit+ ȕ1LowESGscoreit+ ȖitXit+ εit   (b2) 
Qit= αi+ ȕ0Environmental_scoreit+ ȕ1Social_scoreit+ ȕ2Governance_scoreit +  ȖitXit+ εit   
(b3) 
 Exhibit 5.1: Regression variables 
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5.3.2 Robustness test 
In order to ensure that the relationships generated by the model are robust and not the results 
of spurious relationships, robustness checks similar to the one used in Derwall (2007) are run. 
For equations a1, a2, and a3 a robustness check is run using a different variable to account for 
firm size, being one time the book value of assets and another time total sales. The robustness 
check for equation b1, b2, and b3 is done by adding R&D expenditures on sales as a control 
variable.  
5.3.3 Regression assumptions 
OLS estimation technique is used in this study. To ensure that the model used is well 
specified and that the results are unbiased, the five OLS assumptions need to hold (Brooks, 
2008).  
First, endogeneity is a common issue when dealing with corporate financial data. The error-
term should not be correlated with the independent and control variables in order to obtain 
unbiased estimates of regression coefficients. We check that residuals of the equations are not 
correlated with any independent variables. Using the commonly used rule of thumb, results 
with no value over 0.8 or under -0.8 indicate that there is no sign of co-linearity, what 
strengthens our model. Moreover, we include fixed effects to control for the impact of omitted 
variables (Brooks, 2008). 
The second test checks for multicolinearity. Using a correlation matrix, it is controlled that 
there is no linear relationship between the independent and control variables (Appendix II). 
The results show no value over 0.8 or under -0.8, the common rule of thumb, indicating that 
there is no co-linearity; thus, the regression model can be accepted (Brooks, 2008).  
Third, heteroscedasticity is tested using a manual Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. The squared 
residuals from the regression are run against the independent and control variables. Finding a 
p-value of 0 using a F-test, the null-hypothesis for homoscedasticity is rejected. Taking this 
result into account, a White robust standard error is used to reduce the variance to generate 
optimal results (Brooks, 2008).  
Autocorrelation should be tested as it generates biased coefficients that could affect the 
accuracy of the results. However, testing for autocorrelation is mainly relevant when using 
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time series data, and is rarely tested for panel data. Moreover, as the time-dimension of this 
study is also relatively short, autocorrelation is not tested in this study (Brooks, 2008). 
Finally, the null-hypothesis is rejected for the Jarque-Bera test, implying that the residuals are 
not normally distributed. This limitation should be taken into account when interpreting the 
results of the study because we do not want to exclude outliers. First, excluding outliers 
would significantly reduce the size of the sample. Second, it would affect the 
representativeness of the results. Moreover, Brooks (2008) highlights the fact the violation of 
this assumption is left without impact when studies are carried on a large sample, which is the 
case for this study.  
5.4 Variables 
All the variables (dependent, independent and control variables) are built based on data 
retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream, at the exception of firm age which is directly 
retrieved from company’s websites. A limitation to this study comes from the use of 
secondary data. Even though they are useful when conducting longitudinal/cross-sectional 
studies, the use of secondary data presents some shortcomings, such as the lack of control on 
the quality of the available data (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). However, Datastream 
is a database widely used by practitioners and academics, implying data of good quality.  
5.4.1 Dependent variables 
As ESG performance is considered to be an intangible asset for a company (e.g. socially 
responsible performance resulting in higher reputation), practitioners are looking for extra-
financial indicators as a way to reflect the ESG impact on CFP. Both market and accounting 
variables have been used when studying the relationship between CSR and financial 
performance (Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003), thus the same approach is taken in this 
study. We choose Q and ROA as our dependent variables.  
As this research tests market perception of a company’s ESG performance, a market-based 
variable is used to test how ESG can create or destroy shareholder wealth (Mackey, Mackey 
& Barney, 2007). Derwall (2007) chooses Q for this matter. 5  First, Q is a forward-looking 
ratio measuring stock valuation, thus reflecting firm value (Derwall, 2007). Second, it is a 
                                                        
5
 Q is defined as follows: Q = Market value of firm
Replacement value of the firm's assets (Lewellen & Badrinath, 1996) 
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ratio commonly used in empirical research as a proxy for firm value (Erikson & Whited, 
2006). As the replacement value of a firm’s assets is difficult to assess, the market-to-book 
ratio is used as a proxy for Q.6 According to Erikson and Whited (2006), market-to-book ratio 
is the most commonly used proxy for Q.  
To get a broader view and another perspective on financial performance, the use of 
accounting ratios is considered as well. In addition, accounting data is considered to be less 
noisy compared to market-based measures, as it captures better what is actually happening 
within a company (Lopez, Garcia & Rodriguez, 2007). We will use ROA to measure the link 
between ESG and operating performance as ROA is one of the broadest measures of firm 
operating performance (Derwall, 2007).7 McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988, cited in 
Derwall, 2007) find that ROA relates better with CSP compared to alternative measures. 
Waddock and Graves (1997) show that ROA is strongly related with CSR. They also test 
return on equity as well as return on sales, but they find that they are less related with CSR. 
5.4.2 Independent variable 
For the purpose of this study it is necessary to capture environmental, social, and governance 
issues over a certain period of time. In order to evaluate the overall ESG performance of 
companies, it is required to set certain parameters and criteria, which bring transparency and 
show how a company performs in the three different ESG areas (Kocmanova & Simberova, 
2012).  ESG indicators can fulfil these requirements and are commonly used as extra-financial 
information. They capture and evaluate a company’s socially responsible performance in 
these three areas (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). Therefore, this study uses ESG indicators as an 
independent variable, allowing us to compare companies’ ESG performance over a specific 
period of time.  
A first drawback of the data is that the ESG indicators are difficultly comparable across 
industries. The components for each industry might be different, as for example the 
environmental impact of a service industry is different from one in the energy sector 
(Bertoletti 2010).  The level of corporate governance might also be influenced by industry-
                                                        
6
 Market-to-book ratio is defined as follows:  Market-to-book = ெ௔௥௞௘௧ ௩௔௟௨௘  ௢௙ ௔௦௦௘௧௦஻௢௢௞ ௩௔௟௨௘ ௢௙ ௔௦௦௘௧௦  ,with “market value of 
assets being the sum of the book value of assets and the market value of common stock outstanding minus the 
sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes” (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997 cited in 
Derwall, 2007).   
7
  ROA is defined as follow:  ROA = Net income
Total assets
  (Datastream, 2014) 
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specific factors (Bauer et al., 2008; Johnson, Moorman & Sorescu 2009). To overcome this 
problematic, the sample is created within one industry, the technology industry, in order to be 
able to compare the performance to peers in the same industry. 
A second and very common drawback is the non-existence of any standards concerning ESG 
and sustainability reporting. Thus, companies have different approaches to publish their data, 
what makes a comparison of the company’s performance to peers difficult. Therefore, widely 
accepted reporting standards and frameworks are needed (Eccles et al. 2012).  
To address this second drawback, a set of data based on a single framework with comparable 
benchmarks is used. The study is built on Thomson Reuters’ DataStream - ASSET4 ESG, 
Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance Data. ASSET4 is a leading provider of 
objective, comparable, and auditable extra-financial information. The data is comparable as it 
is evaluated within the ASSET4 ESG framework where 750 individual data points and 250 
key performance indicators (KPI) are analysed. The KPIs are grouped in 18 categories which 
are part of four pillars (Thomson Reuters, 2012a).  
The four pillars are the following: Economic Performance, Environmental Performance, 
Social Performance, and Corporate Governance Performance. We exclude the first pillar 
‘Economic performance’ as this pillar will be partly reflected in our dependent variables. This 
leaves us with three pillars and 14 categories presented in exhibit 5.2.  
 
 
 
Exhibit 5.2: The three pillars of the ESG framework  
Source: Thomson Reuters, 2012a 
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Several KPIs are grouped under each category (Appendix III). Based on the evaluation of 
each KPI, an overall score is calculated for each pillar.8 The data input for the different KPIs 
is taken from publicly available sources, for example sustainability/CSR reports, company 
websites, annual reports and proxy filings (Thomson Reuters, 2012a).  
As pointed out by Soana (2011) and Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003), a clear weakness in 
measuring CSR performance is that most of the available data is based on information given 
out by the companies themselves. Thus, in most of the cases there is no independent third 
party confirming the correctness of these scores. 
ASSET4 aims to overcome this issue by also conducting an ethical screening on companies. 
If controversial information about a company, published by NGO as well as news reports, is 
detected, this might lead to the attribution of a lower score for specific criteria.9 In addition to 
that, the rating for each pillar is weighted by a transparency factor. This means that the more a 
company is providing relevant information the better it will be ranked compared to a company 
of similar quality but with less reported information (Thomson Reuters, 2012a).  
Studying ESG scores of companies, we retrieved individual scores for Environmental, Social 
and Governance. An equally weighted overall score was calculated for ESG performance 
(ESGscore). The study also accounts for the possible non-linearity between financial 
performance and ESG scores using an alternative model (Derwall, 2007). In this second 
model, the absolute ESG scores are replaced by two dummy variables, HighESGscore and 
LowESGscore. The dummy HighESGscore takes the value 1 for high ESG performance 
(scores over 90) and the value 0 for scores under or equal to 89.  The dummy LowESGscore 
takes the value 1 for low ESG performance (scores under 20), and the value 0 for scores over 
or equal to 21. The thresholds of 90 and 20 were chosen considering the distribution of the 
sample, to ensure that the group tested are significant enough for the results to be 
representative. Finally, for the third step of the regression, we consider the individual scores 
on each pillar to regress them against our dependent variables.  
 
 
                                                        
8
 Details for the calculations are available at: 
http://extranet.datastream.com/data/ASSET4%20ESG/documents/ASSET4_ESG_Methdology_FAQ_0612.pdf 
9
 Details for the ethical screeening criteria are available at : 
http://extranet.datastream.com/data/ASSET4%20ESG/documents/EthicalScreening_DS_QuickGuide.pdf 
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5.4.3 Control variables  
As we use two different dependent variables, we need to select the relevant control variables 
to include in our regression.  
Control variables for measuring the link between ESG performance and ROA 
Consistent with Derwall (2007), Nelling and Webb (2009) and Waddock and Graves (1997), 
we control for firm size using the book value of assets10 and total sales,11 and for risk using 
the debt to asset ratio.12 Size, risk, and industry are the most frequently used control variables 
when studying CSP and financial performance (Ullman, 1985; Vogel, 2005; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997). As we study one industry, we do not need to control for industry factors.  
Size is of particular relevance as it has been proven that smaller firms do not exhibit CSR 
behaviour to the same extent as larger firms do. Burke et al. (1986 cited in Waddock & 
Graves, 1997) explain this difference by stating that growing and bigger firms attract more 
attention that lead them to disclose more information to respond to stakeholder demands. To 
account for size, we first use book value of assets, and sales are used to perform a robustness 
check to confirm our results. Consistent with previous empirical findings, we expect size to 
affect ROA positively.   
Waddock and Graves (1997) highlight the fact that risk is another relevant proxy because 
management’s attitude toward risk may impact directly the firm performance through 
decisions related to investment opportunities (building or destroy markets) and cost 
management (incurring cost for controlling pollution, improving working conditions, etc.).  
This is why the ratio debt on asset is used to control for risk. Hence, debt on asset is expected 
to affect ROA negatively.  
Control variables for measuring the link between ESG performance and Q 
Other factors than ESG performance are possibly influencing firm value, what needs to be 
controlled for. The control variables chosen are the same as used by Derwall (2007) and 
                                                        
10
 Book value of assets is defined as “the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets.” 
(Datastream, 2014) 
11
 Sales are defined as “gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances.” 
(Datastream, 2014) 
12
 Debt to asset ratio is calculated as follows:  (Short Term Debt & Current Portion of Long Term Debt + Long 
Term Debt) / Total Assets * 100 (Datastream, 2014)  
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Waddock and Graves (1997): yearly sales growth,13 ROA, firm age, firm size (using book 
value of assets), and R&D expenditures on sales. These are control variables commonly used 
when studying either the link between CSR and CFP (Derwall, 2007; Waddock & Graves, 
1997) or the link between corporate governance and CFP (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003). 
Sales growth is a commonly used control variable as good growth opportunities usually result 
in higher Q (Krafft et al., 2013). To account for the firm size, we use the natural logarithm of 
the book value of assets (Derwall, 2007). Consistent with empirical findings, both sales 
growth and firm size are expected to positively affect Q. Previous research finds that ROA, 
controlling for the firm’s operating performance, affects Q positively, whereas firm age 
impacts Q negatively. Q is a forward-looking measure taking into account growth opportunity 
and younger firms usually exhibit higher growth opportunities (Czarnitzki & Delanote, 2013)  
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that the inconsistency in research linking CSP and CFP 
comes from flawed empirical analysis. They defend that most of the models are misspecified 
because academics ignore the positive link between R&D investments and firm’s financial 
performance. Not only do they demonstrate the necessity of introducing investment in R&D 
as a control variable, but they also show a strong positive relationship between R&D intensity 
and CSP. For this reason, R&D expenditure on total sales is used as a control variable in order 
to check the robustness of the results. Especially in the technology industry, R&D and 
innovation are seen as drivers of form performance (Xerfi, 2012). Thus, we expect R&D to 
have a positive impact on Q.  
5.5 Reliability & Validity 
To ensure that the results of the empirical research are reliable, some points need to be taken 
into consideration (Bryman & Bell, 2011). To do so, we need to be sure that we minimise all 
sorts of errors in our study. 
A first possible concern comes from the consistency in data collection. First, most of the data 
used comes from companies’ financial statements. Second, Datastream is used to collect data 
and to select companies. This is a database widely used by academics and practitioners, 
therefore it can be considered as a reliable source. Concerning the ESG scores, shortcomings 
of these scores are presented in section 4.3.3. Considering that the construction of the data 
                                                        
13
 Sales growth is calculated as follows: (Current Year's Net Sales or Revenues / Last Year's Total Net Sales or 
Revenues - 1) * 100 (Datastream, 2014) 
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follows a specific framework and comes from a reliable institution, we believe they are one of 
the most reliable data available at the moment for measuring non-financial performance of 
companies. By using data from the same source and ensuring that these data are right, we 
believe to be consistent in data collection, hence minimising issues with internal reliability. 
For this reason, we believe our results to be reliable.   
The use of a four-year time period enables us to minimise the risk of temporal errors affecting 
our data (Bryman & Bell, 2011), but it also strengthens the stability of the results of our 
study, thus impacting positively on the reliability. Finally, to analyse the data, we run 
regressions using Eviews 8, and, as mentioned before, residual diagnostic tests were done to 
check for possible biases that could affect the results of our study.  
Validity states whether the results of the study can be trusted or not. We especially pay 
attention to three different types of validity: measurement validity, internal and external 
validity (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Concerning internal validity, which relates to the issue of 
causality (Bryman & Bell, 2011), it is important to highlight that we are aware that other 
variables do impact ROA and Q. This study does not aim to explain all the variation of the 
dependent variables, which is why a modest R-squared is found when running the regressions. 
Moreover, we are aware of possible endogeneity problems, especially as researchers have 
argued for a virtuous circle rather than a direct causal link between CSR and CFP (Nelling & 
Webb, 2009). External validity is concerned by whether our result can be generalised or not 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). It is therefore important that this study reflects listed companies of 
the US technology sector.  We earlier discussed the selection process of our sample. As 
mentioned, the research is based on the belief that ESG characteristics do vary across 
industries, which is why these results cannot be applied to other industries. The same 
reasoning applies for generalisation across countries as regulations and culture influence ESG 
performance (Doh & Guay, 2006). Thus, the purpose of this study is to set a base for further 
studies. In addition, readers may be aware of limitations due to the time period studied. The 
time period studied includes the financial crisis, which could affect results, thus further 
studies should be conducted over a longer time period when data will be available, to improve 
the validity of the results. Finally, measurement validity analyses whether the measure of a 
concept does reflect this concept or not. The variables used in this study are commonly used 
in previous research carried out on the topic (Derwall, 2007; Nelling & Webb; 2009; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997). We also take into consideration McWilliams and Siegel’s (2000) 
findings about the importance of R&D that we include as a control variable for market 
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performance. In addition, ESG scores have been used to conduct different studies in the field 
of corporate finance, but we acknowledge that they might not always be objective measures, 
as highlighted in section 3.3.2.  
We thoroughly present the methodology of our study, based upon theoretical findings and 
previous empirical research. Therefore, we believe it can be easily repeated and applied to 
other industries as well countries.  
5.6 Alternative approaches 
As mentioned in section 5.1, we decide to run a panel data regression using OLS method 
rather than Fama-Macbeth model. Skoulakis (2008) shows that in presence of a large number 
of cross-sections, both Fama-Macbeth and OLS provide reliable results. We suggest that 
further research should use both OLS and Fama-Macbeth as a robustness check (Skoulakis, 
2008).  
Using a portfolio approach (Fama & French, 1993) is an alternative method commonly used 
to investigate the link between CSP and CFP. For instance, previous studies have analysed the 
return of socially responsible mutual funds compared to conventional funds in order to draw 
conclusion on the relevance of CSR. However, these studies often lack of a clear conclusion 
(Viviers & Eccles, 2012). Derwall (2007) points out that the lack of significant results might 
come from two shortcomings. First, mutual fund performance can be biased by omitted 
variables or variables that are hard to quantify, such as fund manager skills or screening 
methods. Second, proving the existence of a premium for socially responsible funds may be 
difficult as CSR funds and conventional funds are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, socially 
responsible firms are seen as less risky (Kurucz, Colbert & Wheeler, 2008). Thus, investors 
claim lower returns from firms with high ESG performance (Aman & Nguyen, 2008). 
Therefore, using the portfolio approach causes the difficulty to adjust correctly for risk in 
order to make abnormal returns comparable and results reliable. 
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6. Empirical findings 
 
This section outlines the results of the regression analysis. After explaining the descriptive 
statistics of the data used, the results of the regressions are presented and interpreted for the 
investigation of the hypotheses mentioned in section 4. 
6.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
6.1.1 ESG scores 
This section analyses the descriptive statistics of the independent variable, the ESG score. It is 
interesting to analyse these results to observe if the developments of the scores reflect the 
main belief that companies improve their ESG performance due to rising concerns about these 
issues (Koelher & Hespenheide, 2013). 
As presented in exhibit 6.1, the mean of the overall score increases from 2009 to 2010 by 4 
percentage points and then remains stable at 63%, while the standard deviation remains nearly 
constant over the four years. Both the first quartile and the median increase by 8 percentage 
points over the four years, what shows that ESG performance has improved, especially for the 
lower half of the sample. In 2009, 43 companies have a score under 50% compared to only 30 
companies in 2012. 
       
Exhibit 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the overall ESG score 
Overall ESG score 2009 2010 2011 2012 Change 09/12
Mean 0.59        0.63        0.63        0.63        0.05
Median 0.56        0.62        0.63        0.64        0.08
Standard deviation 0.22        0.21        0.22        0.22        -0.00 
Quartile (first 25%) 0.41        0.44        0.46        0.49        0.08
Quartile (third 75%) 0.77        0.84        0.83        0.83        0.05
Number of companies
Overall ESG score 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average
   0%-10% 0 0 0 0 0
11%-20% 2 1 2 0 1
21%-30% 4 3 4 8 5
31%-40% 19 14 15 12 15
41%-50% 18 14 12 10 14
51%-60% 13 13 10 17 13
61%-70% 11 20 15 11 14
71%-80% 12 8 11 13 11
81%-90% 10 15 19 15 15
91%-100% 11 12 12 14 12
(all values are end of year values)
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Looking at the third quartile, ESG scores improve by 5 percentage points over the studied 
time period. Considering the individual performance of the companies, it can be stated that for 
70 out of a 100 companies the score has improved comparing 2012 data to 2009 data. But 
only 8 out of a 100 companies have improved their score constantly over the four years.  
Exhibit 6.2 shows the statistics for the scores of each pillar. Comparing the scores of 2012 to 
the ones of 2009, the environmental score (E-score) has improved the most, with an increase 
of 7 percentage points for the mean and of 18 percentage points for the median. The social 
score (S-score), increasing by 6 and 11 percentage points respectively, also follows this 
growing trend. For both scores, the standard deviation remains stable. The mean and median 
for the governance score (G-score) is barely developing over the studied time period. But the 
average performance on this pillar is already higher with a mean G-score of 78% in 2012, 
compared to a mean S-score of 55% and a mean E-score of 57%. Moreover, the G-score is the 
only score for which the first quartile is decreasing by 3 percentage points from 2009 to 2012.  
         
Exhibit 6.2: Descriptive statistics of the individual ESG scores 
 
Environmental Score 2009 2010 2011 2012 Change 09/12
Mean 0.51        0.55        0.56        0.57        0.07
Median 0.47        0.58        0.67        0.65        0.18
Standard deviation 0.31        0.31        0.31        0.31        -0.00 
Quartile (first 25%) 0.20        0.23        0.22        0.29        0.10
Quartile (third 75%) 0.83        0.86        0.88        0.87        0.04
Social Score 2009 2010 2011 2012 Change 09/12
Mean 0.49        0.54        0.56        0.55        0.06
Median 0.43        0.54        0.57        0.54        0.11
Standard deviation 0.28        0.27        0.27        0.27        -0.00 
Quartile (first 25%) 0.26        0.30        0.30        0.34        0.09
Quartile (third 75%) 0.75        0.77        0.79        0.79        0.04
Governance Score 2009 2010 2011 2012 Change 09/12
Mean 0.77        0.79        0.78        0.78        0.01
Median 0.80        0.80        0.82        0.80        0.00
Standard deviation 0.14        0.12        0.13        0.12        -0.02 
Quartile (first 25%) 0.74        0.72        0.69        0.71        -0.03 
Quartile (third 75%) 0.85        0.88        0.85        0.87        0.02
(all values are end of year values)
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6.1.2 ROA and Q   
This section analyses the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables to better understand 
the characteristics of the sample. 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 
Return on Assets (ROA)         
          
Mean 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.07 
Median 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.07 
Standard deviation 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.11 
Kurtosis 4.53 5.72 5.50 8.22 
Skewness -1.38 -0.74 -0.83 -1.39 
          
Tobin's q (Q)         
          
Mean 6.93 3.41 1.42 -3.64 
Median 2.23 2.49 2.53 2.46 
Standard deviation 38.10 11.23 13.14 67.92 
Kurtosis 86.95 65.67 57.39 99.52 
Skewness 9.19 1.57 -7.29 -9.96 
Exhibit 6.3: Descriptive statistics of ROA and Q 
 
Looking at the descriptive statistics, both the mean and the median of ROA are stable over the 
four-year period studied. Q presents less stable results: the median is quite stable, but the 
mean values are varying substantially from a year to another. The kurtosis values are high, 
indicating that the sample is leptokurtic. We are aware that some values are extreme (e.g. 
standard deviation), but this may be explained by the characteristics of the industry studied, 
for instance the difficulty for the market to properly valuate some intangible assets, e.g. 
network effects, or growth opportunities.  
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6.2 Regression results 
6.2.1 ESG scores and operating performance 
 
Hypothesis 1: ESG scores relate positively to operating performance, ceteris paribus. 
In order to test the relationship between the overall ESG score and operating performance 
measured by ROA, the regression a1 is run. Exhibit 6.4 shows the empirical results the 
analysis provided.  
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6.4: Regression results for equation a1 and the robustness test 
Analysing the results, the most significant determinants of ROA are debt on assets and book 
value of assets. The former is significant at the 1% level, while the latter is significant at the 
5% level, which confirms the relevance of using these two variables as control variables. 
More specifically, book value of assets affects positively ROA, even though the coefficient 
associated is quite small. Debt on assets, controlling for firm risk, is negatively associated 
with ROA. Both these results are expected, and fall in line with previous empirical findings 
(Derwall, 2007; Waddock & Graves, 1997).   
Intercept 0.06 *** 0.06 ***
(2.96) (2.88)
ESGscore 0.05 * 0.05 *
(1.65) (1.63)
Control variables:
Book value of Assets 5.72E-10 **
(2.07)
Debt on Assets -0.18 *** -0.18 ***
(-5.76) (-5.75)
Sales 9.77E-10 ***
(2.71)
R-squared 0.527 0.528
Adjusted R-squared 0.494 0.496
F-test 16.330 16.390
Prob (F-test) 0.000 0.000
***significant at 1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
ROA (1) ROA (2)
Equation a1 
The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses), 
for the period 2009 to 2012. ROA (2) is the robustness check including sales as a control 
variable. Note that the significance levels correspond to two-sided probabilities. 
 44
Looking at the variable of interest, ESG performance, we can statistically determine the 
relationship between ESG performance and ROA at the 10% level. To be consistent with the 
hypothesis, this study is interested in confirming the positive relationship between ROA and 
ESG performance, thus only considering results on the positive tail of the distribution. The 
coefficient of ESG is positive, meaning that ROA and ESG scores are positively associated. 
The first result comes to support hypothesis 1. 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2, a robustness test using firms’ sales as the variable controlling 
for firm size is run to strengthen the previous results. Consistent with previous results, debt on 
assets is negatively associated with ROA, whereas sales are positively linked with ROA. 
Once again, the statistical relationship between ESG performance and ROA is determined at 
the 10% level. These results confirm hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 1.0: Companies with high ESG scores are associated with higher operating 
performance than companies with lower ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 1.1: Companies with low ESG scores are associated with lower operating 
performance than companies with higher ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
Consistent with hypothesis 1.0 and 1.1, potential non-linearity in the relationship between 
ROA and ESG performance is tested by running equation a2. Exhibit 6.5 presents the results 
of the conducted analysis. 
Once again, both book value of assets and debt on assets are found to be statistically 
associated with ROA, respectively at the 5% and 1% levels. Similarly, debt on assets affects 
ROA negatively, whereas book value of assets affects it positively. The results show that a 
high ESG score is also significant at the 5% level, which proves that the overall ESG score 
affects ROA. As the coefficient of high ESG performance is positive, high ESG performance 
is positively associated with ROA. However, we cannot prove any statistical relationship 
between ROA and low ESG performance.  
The same robustness check is run as for equation a1, using sales to control for firm size. The 
robustness check upholds the previous findings: the positive relationship between high ESG 
performance and operating performance is statistically determined, whereas no statistical 
relationship is found between low ESG scores and operating performance.  
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Having said that, the goodness of fit of the model is reasonable, with 53% of the variability 
explained by the included variables.  
These results support the hypothesis 1.0 that high ESG performance is positively associated 
with ROA, thus operating performance. The regression testing for non-linearity is in line with 
hypothesis 1, but we do not find any evidence of a negative relationship between low ESG 
scores and ROA. This shows proof of non-linearity in the relationship between ESG scores 
and operating performance, and leads to the rejection of hypothesis 1.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6.5: Regression results for equation a2 and the robustness test 
 
 
Intercept 0.09 *** 0.09 ***
(8.20) (7.98)
LowESGscore 0.01 0.01
(0.46) (0.46)
HighESGscore 0.02 ** 0.02 **
(2.02) (1.96)
Difference High-Low ESG score 0.01 0.01
Control variables:
Book value of Assets 5.53E-10 **
(2.49)
Debt on Assets -0.19 *** -0.18 ***
(-7.74) (-7.80)
Sales 9.61E-10 ***
(3.36)
R-squared 0.527 0.528
Adjusted R-squared 0.494 0.495
F-test 16.180 16.250
Prob (F-test) 0.000 0.000
***significant at 1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
ROA (1) ROA (2)
Equation a2 
The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses), 
for the period 2009 to 2012. Note: HighESGscore=1 if ESGscore>89 and 
LowESGscore=1 if ESGscore<21. ROA (2) is the robustness check using sales as an 
extra control variable. To calculate the difference between coefficients, the coefficient of 
the dummy LowESGscore is subtracted from the coefficient of the dummy 
HighESGscore. Note that the significance levels correspond to two-sided probabilities. 
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6.2.2 ESG scores and firm value 
 
Hypothesis 2: ESG scores relate positively to firm value, ceteris paribus. 
Consistent with the second hypothesis, we run the equation b1 to test for the nature of the 
relationship between Q, used as a proxy for firm value, and ESG performance. The results are 
shown in the following table.  
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 6.6: Regression results for equation b1 and the robustness test 
Consistent with Derwall (2007), equation b1 is first run without taking into account R&D 
expenditures on sales, and then a robustness check is run using R&D expenditures on sales, a 
proxy to measure R&D intensity and the innovation capability of a company.  
Intercept -112.67 ** -116.00 ***
(-3.20) (-3.26)
ESGscore 9.11 10.35 *
(1.47) (1.73)
Control variables:
Ln (Book value of Assets) 18.67 *** 19.31 ***
(6.30) (6.45)
Sales growth -4.12 -2.84
(-1.05) (-0.79)
Firm Age -5.23 *** -5.56 ***
(-12.78) (-13.22)
Return on Assets 9.09 15.21
(0.68) (0.96)
R&D expenditures/sales 34.64 **
(2.42)
R-squared 0.256 0.257
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.204
F-test 4.945 4.840
Prob (F-test) 0.000 0.000
***significant at 1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
Q (2)Q (1)
Equation b1 
The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses), 
for the period 2009 to 2012. Q (2) is the robustness check including R&D expenditures 
on sales. Note that the significance levels correspond to two-sided probabilities. 
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On the one hand, firm age and the logarithm of book value of assets are found to be 
statistically significant control variables, the former affecting negatively Q whereas the latter 
impacts Q positively. The nature of the relationship between both variables and Q is in line 
with expectations and previous empirical findings. On the other hand, both ROA and sales 
growth are found to not be significant, which is a more surprising result.   
Both these results are confirmed and strengthened when adding R&D on sales as a control 
variable. Indeed, R&D expenditures on sales are found to statistically affect Q at the 5% level. 
Results show a positive relationship between R&D spending and Q, with a coefficient being 
the highest of all the coefficients. Looking at the variable of interest, ESG score, it is found to 
impact Q positively, when using R&D as a control variable. Without using R&D, the 
statistical significance of ESG performance is not determined because of a p-value superior to 
10%, yet relatively close to 10% (p=10.20%). Nonetheless, in both cases, the coefficient 
associated with ESG score is positive, which confirms the first hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between firm financial performance and ESG scores. 
For this model, the goodness of fit is inferior to the one for operating performance, with only 
26% of the variability in Q being explained by the independent and control variables. This is 
consistent with the idea that market-based measures are noisier.  
To test for non-linearity, and for hypothesis 2.0 and 2.1, equation b2 is run, using dummy 
variables for high-ESG performing and low-ESG performing firms. The results are presented 
in exhibit 6.7. 
Hypothesis 2.0: Companies with high ESG scores are associated with higher 
firm value than companies with lower ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
Hypothesis 2.1: Companies with low ESG scores are associated with lower 
firm value than companies with higher ESG scores, ceteris paribus 
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Exhibit 6.7: Regression results for equation b2 and the robustness test 
 
 
 
Intercept -116.91 *** -120.36 ***
(-3.34) (-3.48)
LowESGscore -8.05 *** -9.10 ***
(-3.23) (-3.58)
HighESGscore 1.74 *** 1.91 ***
(2.78) (2.71)
Difference High-Low ESG score 9.79 11.01
Control variables:
Ln (Book value of Assets) 19.28 *** 19.99 ***
(6.48) (6.72)
Sales growth -3.80 -2.50
(-0.92) (-0.66)
Firm Age -5.22 *** -5.56 ***
(-13.81) (-13.61)
Return on Assets 8.78 14.93
(0.65) (0.93)
R&D expenditures/sales 34.67 **
(2.33)
R-squared 0.256 0.257
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.204
F-test 4.897 4.793
Prob (F-test) 0.000 0.000
***significant at 1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
Q (1) Q (2)
Equation b2 
The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses), 
for the period 2009 to 2012. Note: HighESGscore=1 if ESGscore>89 and 
LowESGscore=1 if ESGscore<21. Q (2) is the robustness check using R&D 
expenditures on sales as an extra control variable. To calculate the difference between 
coefficients, the coefficient of the dummy LowESGscore is subtracted from the 
coefficient of the dummy HighESGscore. Note that the significance levels correspond to 
two-sided probabilities. 
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First, the results found for the control variables are in line with the previous regression. Both 
ROA and sales growth are not significant, whereas the logarithm of the book value of assets 
impacts positively Q and firm age impacts it negatively.  
Regarding ESG scores, we can statistically determine the relationship between high ESG 
scores and Q, but also between low ESG scores and Q, both at the 1% level. More 
specifically, low ESG scores are negatively associated with Q, and high ESG scores are 
positively associated with Q. Moreover, the dummy variable low ESG score shows an 
extremely low coefficient compared to the other dummy, high ESG score. These results are 
confirmed when running the robustness test using R&D expenditures on sales as a control 
variable. As expected, high ESG-performing companies are associated with higher Q, thus 
higher firm value, whereas low ESG-performing companies are associated with lower Q, thus 
lower firm value, confirming both hypothesis 2.0 and 2.1.  
6.2.3 Individual scores and financial performance 
 
Hypothesis 3.0: E, S and G scores are equally important for operating performance,      
ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 3.1: E, S and G scores are equally important for firm value,                           
ceteris paribus.  
Consistent with the third hypothesis, we are interested in studying the impact of each ESG 
score on financial performance.  
Regarding the results found for ROA, shown in exhibit 6.8, all the control variables are 
significant (debt on assets, book value of assets, and sales). The governance factor is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and associated with a positive coefficient. On the other 
hand, we cannot statistically determine the impact of the social factor on ROA. 
Environmental performance is not found to be statistically significant at the 10% level. But as 
the p-value is relatively close to 10%, one should consider the coefficient, which is negative. 
These results are confirmed when running the robustness check using sales as a control 
variable.  
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Exhibit 6.8: Regression results for equation a3 and the robustness test 
 
Studying the link between each ESG score and Q, results are different as presented in exhibit 
6.9. Firm age, book value of assets, and R&D on sales prove to be significant, with similar 
statistical significance and coefficient as in the previous regression. Likewise, we cannot 
determine statistically the impact of the S-score, whereas both E- and G-scores are proven to 
be statistically significant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, coefficients show different patterns 
compared to the coefficients of the above regression with ROA as the dependent variable. For 
instance, environmental performance is positively associated with Q, whereas governance is 
negatively associated with Q. 
 
 
Intercept 0.013 0.011
(0.58) (0.50)
E score -0.029 -0.029
(-1.52) (-1.54)
S score 0.036 0.036
(0.85) (0.85)
G score 0.096 *** 0.096 ***
(2.62) (2.66)
Control variables:
Book value of Assets 5.77E-10 **
(2.47)
Debt on Assets -0.19 *** -0.18 ***
(-8.79) (-8.93)
Sales 9.81E-10 ***
(3.26)
R-squared 0.529 0.531
Adjusted R-squared 0.497 0.498
F-test 16.180 16.250
Prob (F-test) 0.000 0.000
***significant at 1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
ROA (1) ROA (2)
Equation a3 
The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses), 
for the period 2009 to 2012. ROA (2) is the robustness check including sales as a control 
variable. Note that the significance levels correspond to two-sided probabilities. 
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Exhibit 6.9: Regression results for equation b3 and the robustness test 
First, these results are inconsistent with the predictions of hypotheses 3.0 and 3.1 as we find 
discrepancies in the statistical significance of each factor. Second, the accounting-based and 
the market-based perspectives exhibit different results. While the environmental factor is 
statistically significant and is positively impacting Q, it shows a low significance level and 
has a negative impact on ROA. The G-score also exhibits different results: in both case, the 
governance factor is statistically significant but it impacts ROA positively whereas it impacts 
Q negatively. Therefore, hypotheses 3.0 and 3.1 cannot be confirmed.  
  
Intercept -86.79 ** -86.64 **
(-2.05) (-2.05)
E score 25.65 26.86 ***
(3.49) (3.36)
S score -12.96 -13.91
(-1.32) (-1.29)
G score -21.83 *** -22.37 ***
(-2.95) (-2.87)
Control variables:
Ln (Book value of Assets) 18.14 *** 18.54 ***
(5.28) (5.40)
Sales growth -3.49 -2.22
(-1.00) (-0.70)
Firm Age -5.31 *** -5.60 ***
(-12.42) (-12.92)
Return on Assets 10.69 17.19
(0.80) (1.08)
R&D expenditures/sales 34.71 **
(2.42)
R-squared 0.260 0.260
Adjusted R-squared 0.206 0.206
F-statistic 4.921 4.817
Prob (F-test) 0.000 0.000
***significant at 1% level **significant at 5% level *significant at 10% level 
Q (1) Q (2)
Equation b3 
The table reports the OLS coefficients and the corresponding t-statistic (in parentheses), 
for the period 2009 to 2012. Q (2) is the robustness check including R&D expenditures 
on sales. Note that the significance levels correspond to two-sided probabilities. 
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7. Discussion  
 
The overall ESG concept 
As expected, we find that ESG scores are positively associated with operating performance 
and firm value. These results are in line with most of previous studies and meta-studies 
analysing CFP and CSP (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). Thus 
we can conclude that the overall ESG concept tested in the technology industry is no 
exception to these findings.  
The results imply that strong ESG performance relates positively to operating performance for 
the technology industry. This is consistent with researchers arguing that good ESG 
performance can impact positively operating performance through different channels, like for 
example by increasing revenues through reputational benefits consistent with the concept of 
cause-related marketing (Varadajara & Menon, 1988), through competitive advantage (Porter 
& Kramer, 2006; 2011) and even through cost reduction and risk reduction (Koelher & 
Hespenheide, 2012; 2013). This is also in line with Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003) who 
find that CSP and operating performance are positively associated.  
In the same manner, ESG performance relates positively to firm value. This result is expected 
as both measures are supposed to reflect a firm’s financial performance. In addition, firm 
value also reflects investor perception (Derwall, 2007). Thus, companies with high ESG 
performance benefit from higher market valuation. This is in line with previous findings from 
Waddock and Graves (1997), Derwall (2007), and Flammer (2013). The positive relationship 
is explained by the investor’s belief that firms with high ESG scores are less risky leading to a 
lower discount rate, and thus, they benefit from higher valuations (Derwall, 2007).  
Top-performers and laggards 
This study provides deeper insights into the ESG concept when analysing the financial 
performance of companies with very high ESG scores and companies with extremely low 
ESG scores. As expected in hypothesis 1.0, companies with high ESG performance are 
associated with better operating performance. Contrarily, hypothesis 1.1 is not confirmed, 
meaning that companies with extremely low ESG scores are not associated with lower 
operating performance than companies with higher scores. First of all, implications of the 
results for operating performance support the mixed relationship theory (Mintzberg, 1983; 
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Soana, 2011), as there is a clear proof of asymmetry when looking at the difference in 
coefficients between low and high ESG performance.  
Hypothesis 1.1 expects a negative relationship between low ESG scores and operating 
performance, consistent with arguments from Barnett (2007), Porter and Van der Linde 
(1995) and King and Lenox (2000) that poor ESG performance is a sign of operating 
inefficiency. Same is stated by Derwall (2007), who finds that a low eco-efficiency score 
decreases operating performance and explains this by saying that poor environmental 
governance is mostly of tangible nature; thus it is reflected directly in operating performance 
through costs such as clean-up costs from oil spills, or hazardous waste management costs.  
The discrepancy in results might be explained by the industry considered in this paper. As 
plenty of the technology companies outsource the manufacturing of products (HfS Research, 
2012), low ESG performance might affect operating costs less than it does for other 
industries. Many of the costs occurring through bad social and environmental performance are 
borne by sub-contractors and suppliers; as for example, production downtimes through strikes 
or bad working conditions as well as costs incurred by environmental accidents and pollution 
throughout the production process. Nevertheless, we still expect a negative impact as low 
ESG performance of subcontractors and suppliers might negatively affect a company’s 
reputation, and thus sales and operating performance (Varadajara & Menon, 1988). However, 
it is difficult to generalise this assumptions to the overall industry, but we consider it to be an 
explanation on firm level. 
Regarding firm value, the implications are slightly different. The hypotheses that high ESG 
performers have higher firm value than others and that low ESG performers have a lower firm 
value can be confirmed. Moreover, the magnitude of coefficients related to good ESG 
performance and poor ESG performance are quite different. The absolute value of the 
negative coefficient is clearly higher than the one of the positive coefficient. These findings 
are in line with Derwall (2007) who also finds large discrepancies between high eco-efficient 
performers and low eco-efficient performers. Flammer (2013) proposes several arguments 
supporting these findings for environmental CSR. First, she argues that the more 
environmental CSR becomes the norm to follow, the more eco-harmful behaviour is punished 
by the market. Companies seem to be aware of this fact. According to the descriptive 
statistics, companies with scores in the lower half of our sample put more effort into 
improving their overall ESG scores. Second, Flammer (2013) argues that environmental CSR 
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is a resource with decreasing marginal returns. Thus, it is normal that companies with 
extremely high scores have a smaller coefficient than the ones with extremely low scores. 
Moreover, the large difference in magnitude of coefficients may come to support the 
arguments that efficient ESG management does make a difference when a company is facing 
a crisis (Koelher & Hespenheide, 2013). As our empirical study spans over the financial 
crisis, the low coefficient may be the result of the weak resilience of companies with lower 
ESG performance, considered to be more exposed to risk. 
An explanation of the difference in results between market and accounting perspectives on the 
negative impact of bad ESG scores is seen in the forward-looking behaviour of markets 
(Derwall, 2007). Thus, the market might perceive the long-term consequences of poor 
performance, which may not yet be reflected in operating performance.    
Breaking down ESG performance 
The overall ESG concept matters in terms of operating performance as well as for firm value. 
To strengthen the previous hypotheses, we test if all three pillars are contributing to the same 
extent to the results of the overall score. The results show that these hypotheses cannot be 
confirmed.  
Looking at operating performance we only find a significant and positive relationship for the 
G-score. Thus, well-formed governance mechanisms are contributing positively to operating 
performance. This is consistent with what most scholars find in previous corporate 
governance research (Bauer, Guenster & Otten, 2004; Core, Guay & Rusticus, 2006; Core, 
Holthausen & Larcker, 1999; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003). These results are explained 
by the fact that well-governed firms have less agency problems, meaning that manager’s 
interests are aligned with the objectives of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The findings 
also underline the recent SRI trend that the incorporation of corporate governance criteria has 
become increasingly important (US SIF Foundation, 2012).  
The E-score is close to the 10% significance level and shows a slightly negative relationship 
with operating performance. Even if the score is not significant, these findings have a 
tendency to follow the strand of literature arguing that the implementation of CSR practices is 
costly and does not lead to improved financial performance (Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield, 
1985; Barnett, 2007; Gray & Shadbegian, 1993).  
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Just like the E-score, the S-score is also shown to be insignificant in our empirical analysis. In 
addition, results for both scores show very low coefficients. These findings might be 
explained in several ways. First, there is simply no evidence of a consistent relationship 
between CSR and firm performance for the technology sector. This would support the work 
by Waddock and Graves (1997) who find a neutral relationship meaning that there are too 
many other factors influencing the relationship between ESG and CFP. Consistent with that, 
we could also argue for an occurring net effect which leads to the inconsistency in results. 
This is also in line with the fact that previous studies in the field of CSP find diverting results 
and that the link between ESG and CFP might be different from company to company. Thus, 
the relationship should not only be studied on an industry level, but also on a firm level with a 
resource-based view framework (Moura-Leite, Padgett & Galan, 2012). Second, these results 
might be in accordance with the above-mentioned fact that a lot of the costs related to weak 
environmental and social performance are borne by the manufacturing suppliers, thus not 
affecting costs and operating performance directly.  
In terms of market value, the results are more striking. The relationship between the E-score 
and firm value is positive and highly significant. So being environmental friendly seems to 
have a high intangible value and is appreciated by the market. Many previous studies focusing 
on environmental issues related to firm value find positive results (Al-Najjar & Anfimiadou, 
2012; Derwall, 2007; Sinkin, Wright & Burnett, 2008). Recent trends in the technology sector 
show that environmental issues are playing a more and more important role. Companies 
launch environmentally friendly products such as green cell phones, reduce packaging and 
shipping waste, invent apps which contribute to a green lifestyle, and introduce recycling 
programmes for their obsolete products (Tech News Daily, 2011). 
According to our empirical analysis, the G-score is strongly negatively associated with firm 
value. These results are unexpected as most of the previous research find a positive 
relationship. Some scholars argue that the relationship is getting less strong when legal and 
regulatory governance standards are already high in a country which is the case for the US. 
Yet, their findings still show a positive relationship (Bauer, Guenster & Otten, 2004; Chira, 
2014). Our completely opposing results might be explained as follows. First, in previous 
studies, scholars show that only few corporate governance criteria included in indices are 
driving the results, while the other components do not seem to be associated with financial 
performance (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrel, 2008; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Bauer et al., 2008). 
Thus, the overall G-score might not take into account or not weigh enough the value driving 
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criteria what might lead to falsified results. Second, governance might have a negative 
relationship to firm value because of the innovation specificity of the industry. The 
technology sector faces a high amount of disruptive innovation which makes existent 
products obsolete. Therefore, companies have to do large investments which are highly 
uncertain in order to create pathbreaking innovations. Thereby, corporate governance could 
be seen as counterproductive. Companies with high governance standards usually present 
well-founded investment decisions that are communicated with transparency to their 
shareholders. In contrast, entrepreneurial and managerial freedom might be a crucial success 
factor in the technology sector, whereby high information and disclosure requirements might 
impede innovation (Bhattacharya, 2009), what should be further investigated in future 
research. 
The relationship between the S-score and firm value is not significant. This is quite 
unexpected when considering data published by the US SIF Foundation. In 2012, assets worth 
$1.2 trillion were invested under professional management by taking into account social 
aspects. This number is by far the highest compared to $240 billion in assets for 
environmental aspects and $623 billion for governance aspects. This might be explained by 
the fact that the S-score might not reflect properly the criteria that investors judge the most 
important. The score is mainly based on internal social aspects (Employment Quality, Health 
and Safety, Training and Development, Diversity) while external aspects including societal 
and community issues play only partial roles (See Appendix III). Referring to the trends 
outlined by the US SIF Foundation (2012), SRI investors especially care about such external 
aspects as well as fundamental ethical questions, e.g. Sudan-avoidance policies, which are 
often used to sort out companies in a primordial ethical screening. Thus, our results might 
indicate that the criteria composing the S-score are not the ones investors are showing the 
most interest in, supporting Ullman (1985) arguing for a neutral relationship due to 
measurement problems. 
We could neither for operating performance nor for firm value show that all three pillars are 
driving the overall score to the same extent. The results are especially diverting for firm 
value. The G-score is negatively related to firm value whereas the E-score shows a positive 
relationship. Our study contributes to the fact that the G-score matters for operating 
performance, but shows a strong negative relationship with firm value what should not be 
disregarded neither by management nor investors. Nevertheless, it is shown that companies 
with extremely high scores have better operating performance and higher firm value than 
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other companies. Thus, high ESG performance seems to be rewarded from an accounting as 
well as market perspective.  
Implications related to control variables 
Concerning the used control variables, two important findings need to be considered. First, 
and as a limitation to our study, we want to highlight that firm value results should be 
interpreted with caution. ROA and sales growth are shown to be insignificant in any firm 
value regression. This might be a sign that market values in the technology are highly affected 
by other aspects and investors’ expectations. Several market experts are claiming that a tech 
bubble is building up in the sector similar to the dot-com bubble around the turn of the 
millennium (Edward, 2013; Steiner, 2014). The bubble is explained by the low-interest rates 
after the financial crisis. Investors tend to invest in stocks as the risk-free alternative is not 
yielding any return, what drives the stock market up. Moreover, the technology sector shows 
high firm valuations for companies that only have small incomes (Edward, 2013). These high 
valuations are often due to the over-estimation of network effects, which are not always 
sustainable in the long-term (Koller, Goedhard, & Wessels, 2010). Second, McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) find that including R&D as a control variable yields no significant results 
between firm financial performance and CSR performance. We find different results, as 
including it as control variable strengthens the relationship between our variables. Thus, this 
study comes to confirm the need to include R&D intensity as a control variable.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides a first contribution to the study of the relationship between ESG and CFP 
for the US technology sector. Thus, this study adds valuable findings to existing literature by 
analysing overall ESG scores, rather than studying only one pillar, or two, as common in 
previous research. Investigating the business case for ESG for the technology sector, we find 
a positive relationship between ESG performance and financial performance, from both an 
accounting and a market perspective. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the relationship 
between ESG and financial performance do differ whether one considers operating 
performance or firm value. This should be taken into consideration when deriving the 
implications of our findings. 
The implications of our results may be of interest for practitioners, for instance investors and 
managers of listed companies. First, our findings support investors in their investment 
decisions. This study outlines that firms with high ESG scores have higher market values, 
consistent with the idea that these companies are seen as less risky. Therefore, a certain type 
of investors which usually look for less risky investment, should consider ESG scores as a 
proxy for firm risk. Moreover, we demonstrate that ESG investment is not value destroying, 
and rather value creating, both from a market and an accounting perspective. Nevertheless, it 
might be beneficial for investors to decompose the ESG score in order to optimise 
investments as we showed that single scores are not equally important and that some of them 
could be counterproductive.  
This study may also have implications for managers of listed technology firms. First, our 
findings give reasons for managers to focus on improving ESG performance, since it seems to 
benefit CFP. Second, the market does value ESG performance, thus it is important to improve 
the disclosure of non-financial indicators such as ESG, as a lack of transparency usually 
lowers the ESG rating. In addition, we have seen that not all the three different pillars have 
the same significance. Even though we pointed out some limitations in these results due to 
measurement issues, these findings imply that managers need to understand what the score 
captures in order to tailor the best possible strategy. Moreover, managers should not be misled 
by the findings that bad ESG performance is not reflected in operating performance. 
Considering forward-looking market measures, it is shown that bad ESG performance is 
penalised by the market, reflected in lower firm values. 
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As mentioned, it might be helpful for both managers and investors to decompose the scores 
not only into the three pillars, but also in different subcategories in order to understand the 
crucial aspects of ESG for achieving better CFP. This is consistent with Carroll and 
Shabana’s (2010) argument that firms need to focus on the CSR activities that show a 
convergence between the social objectives of society and the firm’s economic objectives. 
Therefore, the ESG scores should also include all the crucial elements driving financial 
performance. For instance, we assume that the S-score, including mostly social aspects on a 
firm level, does not capture all the issues considered important by investors, for example the 
company’s attitude to fundamental societal and ethical issues. Thus, further research should 
be conducted in order to find out which of the ESG elements composing the scores are the 
key factors influencing financial performance. This will also help to make the ESG concept 
more transparent and might strengthen a common ESG model which is better comparable 
across companies.  
This study provides a foundation for future research on the ESG concept in the technology 
sector. Industry level studies seem to deliver more accurate results. The key ESG factors 
influencing the CFP on an industry level should be investigated for other industries. This will 
allow investors and managers to understand industry-specific features and differences 
concerning ESG performance. Moura-Leite, Padgett and Galan (2012) argue that studies 
should combine industry level studies and firm level studies on a resource-based view to 
better understand the challenges and characteristics of ESG. Therefore, we believe our study 
is a basis for further qualitative research at industry and firm level to understand the drivers of 
the concept and to better highlight the key factors affecting CFP positively or negatively.  
When conducting this study, little research was available on the key factors affecting firm 
value of the technology firms in the US. We find that some traditionally used control 
variables such as ROA or sales are not significant in conducting a market-based analysis for 
the technology industry, calling for further explanation. It also highlights the fact that one 
should adapt and understand which variables drive financial performance on industry level, 
such as R&D intensity for the technology sector. Further research could investigate this 
question, especially as there is a concern about the existence of a bubble in this sector. 
Companies with high ESG performance have higher financial performance compared to their 
peers. Nevertheless, the study does not show if better CFP is achieved through high ESG 
performance or if well performing companies have more resources to invest in ESG 
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performance. Thus, we do not draw any conclusion regarding the direction of the causality. 
Past studies have failed to clearly distinguish the causality between ESG/CSP and financial 
performance, though arguing for a “virtuous circle” (Nelling & Webb, 2009).  The 
improvement of measurement standards, such as ESG indicators, over time may help to 
understand the causality of the link between ESG and financial performance and should be 
investigated in the future. 
In this study, we conduct our analysis over four years, and find a positive relationship 
between ESG performance and financial performance. It would be interesting to carry out a 
similar study over a longer period, to strengthen the results of this study, especially as ESG 
aspects are considered being important for long-term value creation and sustainability.  
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Appendix II: Correlation matrices  
 
Correlation for equations a 
 
 
 
Correlation for equations b 
 
Correlation ROA ESG Sales BV of assets Debt/assets
ROA 1.00
ESG 0.16 1.00
Sales 0.18 0.39 1.00
BV of assets 0.22 0.40 0.98 1.00
Debt/assets -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 1.00
Correlation Q ESG Firm age ln(BV of 
assets) ROA Sales growth R&D/sales
Q 1.00
ESG 0.58 1.00
Firm age 0.05 0.24 1.00
ln (BV of assets) 0.03 0.58 0.18 1.00
ROA 0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.27 1.00
Sales growth 0.01 0.06 -0.11 0.08 0.36 1.00
R&D/sales 0.02 0.09 -0.30 -0.35 -0.32 -0.11 1.00
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Appendix III: Asset4 ESG Framework 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCORE 
 
Emission Reduction -Premium 
Emissions Reduction Policy 
CO2 Equivalents Emission Total 
CO2 Equivalents Emission Direct 
CO2 Equivalents Emission Indirect 
CO2 Equivalent Indirect Emissions, Scope Three 
Commercial Risks and/or Opportunities Due to 
   Climate Change 
CO2 Reduction 
Ozone-Depleting Substances Reduction 
NOx and SOx Emissions Reduction 
NOx Emissions 
SOx Emissions 
VOC Emissions Reduction 
VOC Emissions 
Waste Total 
Non-Hazardous Waste 
Hazardous Waste 
Waste Recycling Ratio 
Water Pollutant Emissions 
Waste Reduction Initiatives 
Environmental Management System Certified  
Sustainable Transportation 
Environmental Expenditures 
 
Resource Reduction – Premium 
Energy Efficiency Policy 
Toxic Chemicals or Substances Reduction 
Energy Use Total 
Direct Energy Purchased 
Direct Energy Produced 
Coal Energy Purchased 
Coal Energy Produced 
Natural Gas Energy Purchased 
Natural Gas Energy Produced 
Oil Energy Purchased 
Oil Energy Produced 
Electricity Purchased 
Electricity Produced 
Renewable Energy Use 
Green Buildings 
Water Efficiency Policy 
Water Use Total 
Water Recycled 
Environmental Supply Chain Management 
 
Product Innovation - Premium 
Energy Footprint Reduction 
Environmental R&D Expenditures 
Renewable/Clean Energy Products 
Water Technologies 
Product Innovation/ Product Impact Minimization 
 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL SCORE 
 
Employment Quality Premium 
Employment Quality/ Policy 
Employee Satisfaction 
Employment Quality/ Salaries 
Employment Quality/ Salaries Distribution 
Bonus Plan for Employees 
Generous Fringe Benefits 
Employment Quality/ Employment Awards 
Trade Union Representation 
Employees Leaving 
Turnover of Employees 
 
Health & Safety Premium 
Health & Safety / Policy 
Total Injury Rate 
Lost Time Injury Rate 
Lost Days 
HIV-AIDS Programme 
 
Training & Development Premium 
Training and Development/ Policy 
Average Training Hours 
Training Costs Total 
Internal Promotion 
Management Training 
 
Diversity - Premium 
Diversity and Opportunity/ Policy 
Women Employees 
Women Managers 
Positive Discrimination 
Flexible Working Hours 
Day Care Services 
 
Human Rights - Premium 
Human Rights/ Policy 
Human Rights Contractor 
Human Rights Breaches Contractor 
 
Community - Premium 
Community/ Policy 
Donations Total 
Cash Donations 
In-Kind Donations 
Donations 
Crisis Management Systems 
 
Product Responsibility Premium 
Product Responsibility/ Policy 
Customer Satisfaction 
Product Access Low Price 
Healthy Food or Products 
 
 
75 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE 
 
Board Structure - Premium 
Board Structure/ Policy 
Board Structure/ Experienced Board 
Board Structure/ Non-Executive Board Members 
Board Structure/ Percentage of Independent Board Members 
Board Structure/ CEO-Chairman Separation 
Board Structure/ Background and Skills 
Board Structure/Size of Board 
Board Structure/Board Diversity 
 
Board Function- Premium 
Board Functions/ Audit Committee Independence 
Board Functions/ Audit Committee Management Independence 
Board Functions/ Audit Committee Expertise 
Board Functions/ Compensation Committee Independence 
Board Functions/ Compensation Committee Management Independence 
Board Functions/ Nomination Committee Independence 
Board Functions/ Nomination Committee Management Independence 
Number of Board Meetings 
Board Meeting Attendance Average 
 
Compensation Policy - Premium 
Compensation Policy/ Policy 
Compensation Policy/ Highest Remuneration Package 
Compensation Policy/ Board Member Compensation 
Compensation Policy/ Stock Option Program 
Senior Executive Long-term Compensation incentives 
Vesting of Stock Options/Restricted Stock 
 
Shareholder Rights - Premium 
Shareholder Rights/ Policy 
Voting Rights 
Ownership 
Classified Board Structure 
Staggered Board Structure 
 
Vision & Strategy - Premium 
Integrated Vision and Strategy Challenges and Opportunities 
CSR Sustainability Committee 
GRI Report Guidelines 
CSR Sustainability Report Global Activities 
CSR Sustainability External Audit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters: http://extranet.datastream.com/data/ASSET4%20ESG/Index.htm 
